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The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision.
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired
a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired or preserved through
anticompetitive conduct. A textualist analysis accordingly suggests that Section 2
should be applied to impose liability and corrective remedies on all monopolies and
attempts to monopolize.
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A textualist approach to statutory construction would not imply or create
unstated exceptions. Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit
exception for a monopoly acquired or preserved without proof of anticompetitive
conduct, none should be implied or created. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to
prove the corporation involved engaged in improper conduct should be overturned.
This Article also briefly analyzes the practical economic implications likely to
follow if the courts adopt a “no-fault” approach to monopolization law. This
analysis will demonstrate that the overall economic effects will be uncertain.
They will depend upon empirical issues whose net effect is speculative or
ambiguous. They nevertheless are likely to be beneficial on the whole, and this
provides some support for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that
the Article’s textualist conclusions should be implemented.
Imposing sanctions on all extremely large monopolies could improve economic
welfare in many ways. This should increase innovation and international
competitiveness. It should prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly
pricing and the form of exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth
from consumers. It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from
monopolies enjoying a “quiet life.” It should avoid the waste that can arise as a
firm struggles to attain and protect its monopoly, and some of the time and cost of
Section 2 litigation. It should improve privacy and decrease income inequality.
The new standard would admittedly also cause some costs and difficulties.
For example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could sometimes send a
confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition,
especially as a firm’s market share neared the ambiguous level required for a
violation. No-fault liability could also enable competitors to file baseless
lawsuits. The transaction costs involved in imposing sanctions on monopolies
could be significant. It also could lead to difficult remedy issues in cases
involving natural and patent monopolies. We believe, however, that the benefits
of no-fault are likely to outweigh the costs.
Textualism has been used in more and more Supreme Court analyses in recent
years. Moreover, there recently have been many calls, from very different parts of
the political spectrum, for imposing sanctions on extremely large monopolies
without inquiring into whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct.
This issue has not, however, been analyzed seriously either from a legal or an
economic perspective in roughly a half century.
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve all of the relevant questions. Its goal
is to re-kindle debate about the legal and economic issues involved in imposing
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize under the Sherman Act
and also, a fortiori, under Section 5 of the FTC Act. And to demonstrate that its
textualism-derived conclusions constitute reasonable policy options.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Sherman Act1 originally was designed to impose
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless
whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct.2 This conclusion
emerges from the first ever textualist3 analysis of the language in the
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018).
2. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51–647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 2) (making it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”).
3. See infra Section II.A (explaining variations of textualism and using the type of
textualism championed by Justice Scalia). Author Lande is not a textualist. However,
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statute, a form of interpretation originally performed only by Justice
Scalia4 but now increasingly used by the Supreme Court, including in
its recent Bostock v. Clayton County5 decision.6
Using Scalia’s approach, this Article analyzes contemporaneous
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases,7 and demonstrates that when

at all times some, and even sometimes all, Supreme Court justices are textualists. See
infra notes 4–6. For this reason, the goal of this article is to analyze Section 2 using
textualist principles.
4. See Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Justice
Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 186
(2017) (referring to Justice Scalia as a “pioneer” of textualism). Indeed, in the past,
even prominent conservative legal scholars were not textualists. See Robert H. Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966) (basing the
Sherman Act analysis on Congress’s intent when passing the law and policy
considerations); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 193–
94 (2008) (discussing the influence of Bork’s analysis of the Sherman Act’s legislative
history in interpreting the Sherman Act, including on judges such as Richard Posner
and Frank Easterbrook).
5. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
6. See id. Even though all three opinions in this case employed textualist analysis,
they disagreed with one another as to the specific results of this analysis. Jonathan
Skrmetti eloquently observed that in Bostock,
[A]ll nine justices adopt[ed] a purely textualist approach and disagree[d] only
about what flavor of textualism the Supreme Court should employ . . . . [T]his
is a new highwater mark for textualism . . . with the unanimous court
identifying textualism as the sole appropriate method for resolving an
important statute’s meaning. Gorsuch’s proclamation that “[o]nly the written
word is the law” did not stir the slightest disagreement. Various members of
the court will surely employ other methodologies in upcoming cases, but
Bostock leaves no doubt that textualism is the predominant method of statutory
interpretation for the current court.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written Word Is the
Law,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/
06/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law
[https://perma.cc/S4JX-5964]. See Ryan Lovelace, Elena Kagan: The Supreme Court Is a
‘Textualist Court’ that Reasons More like Scalia than Breyer, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 16, 2017,
7:04PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/elena-kagan-the-supreme-court-is-atextualist-court-that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer [https://perma.cc/7JZV-GERP]
(reporting that Justice Kagan stated, “[W]e are a generally, fairly textualist court, which
will generally think when the statute is clear you go with the statute”); see also Alderman
& Pickard, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that Justice Gorsuch approved of Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan’s textualist analysis in Lockhart v. United States).
7. See infra Section II.A (explaining that Justice Scalia’s approach to textualism
does not consider legislative debates or committee reports; instead, it interprets words
and phrases in the context of the history of the time in which the statute was enacted).
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Congress passed the Sherman Act, the word “monopolize” simply
meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not
limited to monopolies acquired or preserved through anticompetitive
conduct. A textualist analysis accordingly suggests that Section 2
should be applied to impose liability and corrective remedies on all
monopolies regardless of “fault.”8
This textualist analysis also will show that when courts use the
Sherman Act to impose sanctions on firms that “monopolize[] or
attempt to monopolize,”9 because the statute contained no exceptions
for firms that did not engage in anticompetitive conduct,10 contrary
case law should be overturned.11
Recent events have transformed this issue into a timely antitrust
topic.12 Prominent politicians on both the left13 and right14 have called
not just for an investigation into whether important alleged large
monopolies, including Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Google, have
engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Senators Sanders and Warren, for

8. See infra Part III (conducting a textualist analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
9. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209; see infra Section
III.A (interpreting the meaning of “monopolize” through dictionaries and legal
treatises).
10. See infra Section III.C and note 168 and accompanying text (explaining no
exception for a monopoly secured without proof of anticompetitive conduct should
be implied or created because that exception is not explicit in the Sherman Act).
11. See infra Section IV.B (describing the process of overturning statutory
precedent while noting that courts have not been particularly bound by Sherman Act
precedent).
12. See infra Part V (discussing the recent anti-monopoly political rhetoric arising
from both parties and explaining the modern economic changes supporting a “nofault” analysis).
13. See infra Part V; see also infra notes 220–21 (explaining the views of Senators
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders).
14.
The enforcers now encircling the four most innovative and investor-beloved
companies in America[,] [Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon,] include
the Trump Justice Department; the majority Republican FTC; the antitrust
subcommittees of both the Democratic House and Republican Senate; a posse
of 51 state and territorial attorneys general pursuing Google, and a squad of
47 AGs dogging Facebook.
Roger Parloff, Behind the Big Tech Antitrust Backlash: A Turning Point for America, YAHOO
FIN. (Dec. 11, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/amazon-facebook-googleantitrust-backlash-152518336.html [https://perma.cc/6XCZ-TD3V]; see also infra notes
219, 221 (noting President Trump’s willingness to break up “Big Tech” companies).
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example, have bluntly said that these “monopolies” should be broken up.15
They have called for the implementation of no-fault monopolization.16
This Article will re-examine the appropriateness of the current legal
standards for what often is called “no-fault monopolization.”17 It will
demonstrate that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Verizon Communications Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,18 which clarified relevant case law
and emphatically held that fault is required for a Section 2 violation,19
was wrongly decided. This Article will show how Trinko and other cases
should have been decided if textualism were applied to Section 2 cases,
and that these cases should have had no-fault results.
As background and by contrast, this Article in Part I will first engage
in a traditional or “purposivist” analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman
15. Elizabeth Culliford, Where U.S. Presidential Candidates Stand on Breaking up Big
Tech, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2020, 6:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-tech-factbox/where-us-presidential-candidates-stand-on-breaking-up-bigtech-idUSKBN1ZN16C (reporting Senators Sanders and Warren’s views regarding the
need to break up Big Tech companies).
16. See Lauren Hirsch, Bernie Sanders Wants ‘Criminal’ CEOs Locked up, but Lawyers
Say that’s Unlikely to Happen, CNBC (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2019/10/29/bernie-sanders-wants-criminal-ceos-locked-up-but-lawyers-say-itsunlikely.html [https://perma.cc/4Q5A-M687] (“Bernie Sanders has said he would use
the Sherman Antitrust Act to put CEOs of monopolistic companies in jail.”); Ted
Johnson, Democratic Candidates Differ on Ways to Rein in Facebook, Other Big Tech Firms,
DEADLINE (Oct. 15, 2019, 7:55 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/10/democraticdebate-facebook-elizabeth-warren-1202761256
[https://perma.cc/F66X-72M7]
(quoting Senator Elizabeth Warren as saying, “We need to enforce our antitrust laws,
break up these giant companies that are dominating big tech, big pharma, big oil, all
of them”); Cristiano Lima, Bernie Sanders Says He Would ‘Absolutely’ Try to Break up
Facebook, Google, Amazon, POLITICO (July 16, 2019, 10:41 AM) https://www.politico
.com/story/2019/07/16/bernie-sanders-facebook-google-amazon-1416786
[https://perma.cc/95WY-5SFX] (reporting that Senator Bernie Sanders stated that he
would appoint an attorney general “who would break up these huge corporations”);
see also infra Part V (sharing views of other politicians and economists discussing
implementation of no-fault monopolization).
17. See Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV.
755, 766–70 (2020) (discussing the history of the term “no-fault” monopolization); see
also Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in Government
Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 86–88 (1980) (arguing that Congress
should adopt the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures’s endorsement of a no-conduct, or “no-fault,” monopolization approach).
18. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
19. Id. at 407 (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”). But see infra Section IV.A (analyzing prior Supreme Court
opinions that were less clear).
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Act, relying upon the law’s legislative history. As Part II will then
explain, a textualist analysis instead determines the meaning of a law
by examining key statutory words and terms as they were used in
contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, prior cases, and the
earliest cases that followed the enactment of the law.20 Every method
of statutory construction starts with the words of the statute, but
textualism ignores the legislative debates and committee reports that
are central to a traditional approach to statutory analysis.21 It does not
attempt to discern what Congress “intended to do” other than by
examining the words and phrases in the statute.22 Moreover, under a
textualist analysis, as Justice Scalia emphasized, no exception can be
read into a law unless it is explicitly contained in the statute.23
Textualism is a relatively new method of statutory analysis. Until
relatively recently, it was not even employed by most conservative legal
scholars. Perhaps for this reason, before now, no one has undertaken
a textualist analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to determine
whether it requires anticompetitive conduct.24 This Article undertakes
this task in Part III, which demonstrates that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to impose sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to
monopolize.
Part IV will then discuss the relevant Supreme Court Sherman Act
jurisprudence and other cases where the Supreme Court dramatically
re-interpreted statutes after a long period. It shows that, despite
current case law, the Court should similarly re-interpret the Sherman
Act and hold that it imposes sanctions on all monopolies and attempts
to monopolize.
Part V will briefly discuss a half-century of evolving economic
thinking about the costs and benefits of this issue. This Part shows that
the economic effects will be uncertain and dependent upon empirical
issues whose net effect is speculative or ambiguous. They nevertheless
are likely to be beneficial on the whole, and they provide some support

20. See infra Part II; see also infra note 63–64 (noting the importance of history to
textualists because they consider a word’s usage and meaning at the time that a statute
was enacted).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part I; see also infra note 39–41 (stating that a traditional legislative
history analysis for the Sherman Act has been done many times).
23. See infra Section III.C and note 168 (citing an opinion written by Justice Scalia
stating exceptions cannot be read into the law unless explicitly stated).
24. See infra Section II.B.
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for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that the Article’s
textualist conclusions should be implemented.25
No-fault could improve economic welfare in many ways. It should
increase innovation and international competitiveness.26 It should
prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing and the
form of exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth from
consumers.27 It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result
from monopolies enjoying a “quiet life,”28 and also the waste that arises
as firms attain and protect their monopolies.29 It should reduce the
time and costs of Section 2 litigation.30 It should improve privacy and
decrease income inequality.31
The new standard would admittedly also cause some costs and
difficulties. For example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could
sometimes send a confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in
hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s market share neared
the ambiguous level required for a violation.32 It could enable
competitors to file baseless lawsuits.33 The transaction costs involved in
imposing sanctions on monopolies could be significant.34 It also could
lead to difficult remedy issues in cases involving natural and patent
monopolies.35 We believe, however, that the benefits of no-fault are
likely to outweigh the costs.
25. See infra Section V.F.
26. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 8–9 (2012) (arguing that
competition has positive impacts on innovation).
27. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (describing the exploitation
inherent in monopolies).
28. See infra note 307 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits to a
monopoly of living a “quiet life”).
29. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text (detailing rent-seeking behavior
and the impacts of such behavior with regards to waste).
30. See infra notes 319–21 (debating litigation costs in antitrust cases).
31. See infra Section V.B; see also note 239 and accompanying text (examining
income inequality).
32. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 313–15 and accompanying text (describing research on sham
litigation involving antitrust claims).
34. See infra note 318 (explaining transaction costs for the digital technology
markets).
35. See infra Section V.C. Many of the economic uncertainties involving no-fault
can be addressed optimally by selecting suitable remedies, and there are a variety of
remedies available in Section 2 cases. Historically, relatively few monopolies have been
broken up, and we expect that even fewer would be remedied this way under a no-fault

506

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:497

Part VI will discuss the effects this article’s conclusions should have
on case outcomes under the “monopolize[] or attempt to monopolize”
portions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It will also very briefly discuss
no-fault monopolization as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act.36
The concluding Part of this Article takes into account the rising
influence of textualist analysis and calls for a debate into the legal and
economic issues likely to arise from a textualist analysis of Section 2
and its no-fault conclusion. This Part argues that because the article’s
textualist analysis results in a “non-absurd”—and in fact quite reasonable—
policy option, it should be adopted and implemented by the courts.
I. A TRADITIONAL OR PURPOSIVIST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY APPROACH:
USING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND COMMITTEE REPORTS
To better explain and to highlight by contrast this article’s textualist
analysis,37 this Part will undertake a traditional (sometimes called
“purposivist”38) legislative history analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, one that (as is not the case for a textualist analysis) examines the
relevant legislative debates and committee reports.39 This was the most
theory. In other words, even though liability should be determined on a no-fault basis,
the most useful remedy often will be one that simply limits a firm’s conduct. See infra
note 306 and accompanying text (detailing economic uncertainty and the incentive to
compete).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018).
37. Author Lande is not a textualist, except in the sense that this term is used by
Justice Kagan. See supra note 6. Author Lande is a purposivist who believes legislative
debates should be considered when courts determine the meaning of statutes. See
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). However, the goal of this
article is to determine how a textualist judge should interpret Section 2.
38. A traditional analysis of the legislative history of a statute, one that relies upon
the congressional debates and committee reports, is often called a “purposivist”
analysis today. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV.
479, 483, 503 (2013); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18 (2012) (“[Purposivism] has been called ‘the basic
judicial approach these days . . . .’”).
39. A traditional legislative history analysis has been done for the Sherman Act
many times on a variety of antitrust subjects, most famously by Judge Bork. As Judge
Bork noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be “an attempt to
construct the thing we call ‘legislative intent’ using conventional methods of collecting
and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional Record.” Bork, supra note
4, at 7 n.2; see also Lande, supra note 37 (conducting legislative history analysis that
reach different results from Bork); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 4 (same).
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common method of statutory analysis until relatively recently and was
universally used by both conservatives and liberals.40 Like every method
of statutory analysis, it starts with the words and phrases used in the
statute, but—crucially—it supplements this with an analysis of the
relevant legislative debates and committee reports.41 As this Part will
demonstrate, however, a traditional analysis of Section 2 on the nofault issue produces an inconclusive result.
There appears to be only one reference in the Sherman Act
legislative debates or committee reports that is relevant to the question
of whether Section 2 requires anticompetitive conduct.42 It is part of
an exchange that took place at the very end of the debates. Senator
John Kenna asked:
Is it intended by the committee, as the section seems to indicate, that
if an individual . . . by his own skill and energy, . . . shall pursue his
calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his action shall be a
crime under this proposed act? . . . Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is
dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his superior skill in that
particular product it turns out that . . . he is conceded to have a
monopoly of that trade with Mexico; is it intended by the committee
that the bill shall make that man a culprit?43

Senator George Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna’s
hypothetical:
[I]n the case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all . . . .
He has not got the possession of all the horned cattle in the United
States. He has not done anything but compete with his adversaries
in trade, if he had any, to furnish the commodity for the lowest price.
So I assure my friend he need not be disturbed upon that subject.44

Senator Edmund’s response indicates that he believed that no
monopolization was involved in the hypothetical, so he did not really
consider the need for an exception for a firm that achieved its monopoly
solely by superior skill. Senator George Hoar then gave his answer:
[I]n the case put by [Senator Kenna, if] a man who merely by
superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because
40. See Pojanowiski, supra note 38, at 483, 503.
41. Id.
42. Author Lande found only a single reference made in debate to an
anticompetitive conduct requirement, which is analyzed in this Part. Other
conventional legislative history analyses have also failed to reveal any other exchanges
that concern the no-fault issue. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 4, at 29.
43. 21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890) (statement of Sen. Kenna).
44. Id. at 3151–52 (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
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nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, [unless]
it involved something like the use . . . [of unfair] competition like
the engrossing, the buying up of all [rivals].45

Senator Edmunds then provided the final answer to Senator Kenna’s
question:
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in
the committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we
had, and the best answer I can make to both my friends is to read
from Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the verb “to
monopolize”: 1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of,
as a commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or
control the exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea. Like the
sugar trust. One man, if he had capital enough, could do it just as
well as two. 2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right
of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any country or
district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade . . . . [W]e were
not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we
thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase
we did, that if one person instead of two, by a combination, of one
person alone, as we have heard about the wheat market in Chicago,
for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public
interest as if two had combined to do it.46

The Sherman Act, making it illegal to “monopolize” or “attempt to
monopolize,” was then passed by the Senate.47
It is difficult to reconcile the statements of Senators Edmunds and
Hoar. They appear to have been defining the markets differently.48
Senator Edmunds was discussing a large cattle sale to Mexico while
Senator Hoar was discussing all of the cattle in the U.S.49
Alternatively, Senators Edmunds and Hoar may have provided
different answers to Senator Kenna’s question. Senator Hoar did not
consider a firm to be guilty of “monopolization” if it “got the whole
business” by skill and efficiency alone.50 Senator Edmunds, however,
defined “to monopolize” as merely “[t]o engross or obtain by any
means.”51 Senator Edmunds believed that “if one person . . . did it, it

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
Id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
See id. at 3153 (recording the votes that resulted in passage).
See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar).
See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar).
21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
Id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
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was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had
combined to do it.”52 Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly,
although by his first response he did not consider the hypothetical
situation given to describe a monopoly.53
These contradictory statements should be construed as offsetting
one another, and Edmunds’s statement shows the issue was considered
but did not result in a change in statutory language.54 Thus, there is no
evidence of a clear intent of Congress that anticompetitive conduct is
required for a Section 2 violation. Nevertheless, if a judgment had to
be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and he was one of the
main drafters and sponsors of the bill,55 his statements could carry
greater weight. Perhaps this dialogue may constitute some support for
the no-fault interpretation. Moreover, the fact that this discussion took
place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate also could very well
mean that it embodied Congress’s final view on the subject. Perhaps
Senator Edmunds’s opinion, for this reason also, should be given even
more weight. Alternatively, one could conclude that because these
remarks were given so late in the debates, these statements by Senator
Sherman or other legislators were less able to correct or oppose these
statements, so perhaps they should carry less weight.
In summary, a conventional legislative history analysis of the issue
does not give a clear indication of congressional intent.
II. A TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS 56
A. Defining a Textualist Analysis: What Would Justice Scalia Do?
Justice Scalia long was the chief advocate of a method of interpreting
legislation known as the “textualist,” fair meaning, ordinary meaning,
or plain meaning approach.57 He often was joined in this methodology
52. Id.
53. See id. at 3151–52.
54. See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar).
55. See Bork, supra note 4, at 12 (“Edmunds[] [ ] appears to have played the
primary role in drafting the bill which became the Sherman Act . . . .”).
56. Some of the textualist analysis in this Section first appeared in Robert H.
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing
Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013).
57. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal Scholarship Highlight: Justice Scalia’s Textualist Legacy,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2017, 10:48 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/
legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/amp
[https://perma.cc/YC4M-72WS] (stating that “perhaps [Scalia’s] greatest legacy” was
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by other Supreme Court Justices,58 and Justice Neil Gorsuch recently
told the Federalist Society he has become Scalia’s successor:
[A] person can be both a publicly committed originalist and textualist
and be confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Originalism has regained its place at the table of constitutional
interpretation, and textualism in the reading of statutes has triumphed.
And neither one is going anywhere on my watch.59

Justice Scalia expressly rejected the use of such traditional legislative
history sources as the debates in Congress and the reports of congressional
committees.60 He explained:
In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive,
and there is something for everybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal
used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick
out your friends. The variety and specificity of result that legislative
history can achieve is unparalleled.61

He explained further:

changing “the way we think about statutes”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (1997) (“Textualism should not be
confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that
brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no
one ought to be—though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should
not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”).
58. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV.
157, 163 n.18 (2018) (providing examples of Supreme Court justices joining in the fair
meaning approach).
59. Elizabeth Slattery & Tiffany Bates, Neil Gorsuch Just Finished Year 1 on the Supreme
Court. Here’s How He’s Making His Mark, HERITAGE FOUND., (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/neil-gorsuch-just-finished-year-1-thesupreme-court-heres-how-hes-making-his-mark [https://perma.cc/B3QM-L24B].
60. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Weighs in on Posner’s Controversial Book Review, Calls
Posner’s Assertion ‘a Lie,’ ABA J. (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/scalia_weighs_in_on_a_controversial_book_review/?utm_source=
maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/E8252NAN] (“To say that I used legislative history is simply, to put it bluntly, a lie.”).
61. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 36; see also id. at 17 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning
of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated . . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”); id. at 23
(“Only a day or two ago—when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was
indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was. I only want to know
what the words mean.’ And I agree with [Justice] Holmes’s [ ] remark, quoted
approvingly by Justice Jackson: ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means.’”) (footnotes omitted).
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Why would you think this [material—the legislative debates and
committee reports—] is an expression of the legislature’s intent?
And the more you use that garbage, the less accurate it is . . . . [O]ne
of . . . the major[] functions of . . . hot shot Washington lawyers is
drafting legislative history. You send it up to the [H]ill, and get a friendly
Senator to read it into the record or something else, to change the
meaning of the text that’s adopted. So, you know, . . . it’s crazy.62

Instead, Justice Scalia attempted to ascertain the “fair meaning” of
the text of statutes by making extensive use of such material as roughly
contemporaneous dictionaries and legal decisions to define key
terms.63 Justice Scalia also examined the country’s history at
approximately the time of the legislation and the legislation’s societal
context to help define the particular words or phrases in the statutes.64
If Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis were applied to the Sherman Act,
neither its congressional debates nor the committee reports would be
analyzed.65 A textualist analysis would, by contrast, undertake a number
of inquiries to ascertain what the statute “originally” and “fairly”
meant.66 To do this, the inquiry would examine:
1. The definitions of the key terms in dictionaries (Justice Scalia
seems especially interested in the definitions of key words in
contemporary dictionaries67), legal dictionaries, and legal treatises
that existed when these laws were passed. Ideally, we would find
and analyze sources defining these terms as close as possible to
when the Sherman Act was passed.68
62. Lande, supra note 56, at 2362.
63. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 78 (arguing that “[w]ords must be given
the meaning they had when the text was adopted”).
64. Scalia distinguished his approach from a traditional legislative history approach:
[A]ny legal audience knows what legislative history is. It’s the history of the
enactment of the bill. It’s the floor speeches. It’s the prior drafts of
committees. That’s what legislative history is. It isn’t the history of the times. It’s
not what people thought it meant immediately after its enactment.
See Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner Responds to Antonin Scalia’s Accusation of Lying,
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2012) (emphasis added), https://newrepublic.com/article/
107549/richard-posner-responds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying.
65. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 369 (referring to the “false notion that
committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory interpretation”).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 34–35, 37 (citing three sources on guides to statutory interpretation,
and then—as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning—four dictionary
definitions of key terms).
68. Id. at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was
adopted.”); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, app. 1784–90 (2020)

512

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:497

2. English common law cases from before 1890 to determine
whether the federal antitrust statutes borrowed key terms from
the common law and, if so, what they meant in common law
decisions.69 We could also make inferences from state antitrust
statutes that existed when the federal antitrust laws were passed,
and their interpretations in courts, in case the federal laws
borrowed key terms from a state statute.70
3. The use of key terms in federal antitrust cases from the 1890s to
help determine “what people thought [the statute] meant
immediately after its enactment.”71
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing five contemporary dictionaries in the appendix of his
textualist opinion to ascertain what the word “sex” meant in 1964). See generally SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 415–24 (explaining the appropriate use of
dictionaries to analyze text).
69. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 320 (“A statute that uses a common-law
term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”); see infra note 77 (stating
that Justice Scalia cited, with apparent approval, a pre-Sherman Act common law
antitrust case).
70. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justice Scalia examined
roughly contemporaneous state constitutional provisions and statutes to help
determine what various terms in the Second Amendment meant:
[N]ine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the first
two decades of the 19th[] [ ] enshrined a right of citizens to “bear arms in
defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms in defense of himself and
the state.” . . . That was also the interpretation of those state constitutional
provisions adopted by pre-Civil War state courts.
554 U.S. at 584–85. Scalia was also guided by analogous state statutes, stating, “Many
colonial statutes required individual arms bearing for public-safety reasons—such as
[a] 1770 Georgia law . . . . That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation
given to the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843.” Id. at 601.
This surely is the weakest of the aids to interpretation because state statutes could be
inconsistent with one another.
71. Posner, supra note 64. In Heller, Justice Scalia used statutory interpretations of
the Second Amendment from the period shortly following its adoption as a guide to
determining its meaning. As he explained:
We now address how the Second Amendment was interpreted from
immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century . . . . [We
conduct an] examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine
the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or
ratification. That sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional
interpretation. As we will show, virtually all interpreters of the Second
Amendment in the century after its enactment interpreted the Amendment as
we do . . . . [The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment
universally] protect an individual right unconnected with militia service.
Id. at 605.
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4. The “history of the times.”72 It would use the history of the period
producing the antitrust laws to help ascertain what Congress
meant when it used terms like “monopolize” or “attempt to
monopolize” in the Sherman Act.
5. A textualist analysis would not imply or invent any exemptions
that are not plainly evident in the words of the statutes.73 If an
antitrust law contains an explicit exemption then of course that
exemption would be respected. But no non-explicit exemptions
would be inferred in order to achieve some overall goal or
purpose of the statute.74
6. A textualist interprets language fairly, ordinarily and reasonably,
but not “literally.” Justice Scalia said that “the good textualist is

72. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 30; see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 399 (arguing
that lawyers and judges are qualified to do the historical research that originalism
requires); see also id. at 400–02 (discussing how the history of gun use in the United
States helps interpret a gun control statute). Moreover, Scalia quotes, with apparent
approval, Chief Justice Taney:
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be
influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of
Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or
reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were
offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the
only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their
intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity
exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the
public history of the times in which it was passed.
SCALIA, supra note 57, at 30 (footnote omitted).
73. See infra Section III.C (explaining Scalia’s view that no exception should be
read into a statue unless explicitly contained therein); see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749
(second alteration in original) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 101)
(“[U]nexpected applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s ‘presumed
point [to] produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad
hoc exceptions.’”).
74. Scalia believed that no exception should be inferred to achieve a greater
purpose because:
[E]ven if you think our laws mean not what the legislature enacted but what
the legislators intended, there is no way to tell what they intended except the
text. Nothing but the text has received the approval of the majority of the
legislature and of the President, assuming that he signed it rather than vetoed
it and had it passed over his veto. Nothing but the text reflects the full
legislature’s purpose. Nothing.
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory Constitutional Interpretation,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012).
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not a literalist.”75 Scalia and Garner explain that the “notion that
words should be strictly construed” is untrue.76 They quote
Justice Frankfurter: “Literalness may strangle meaning.”77 As
Justice Brett Kavanaugh observed in Bostock, “courts must follow
ordinary meaning, not literal meaning.”78
7. A textualist tries very hard not to reach an “absurd” conclusion. The
“absurdity doctrine” means that no statute should be interpreted in
an absurd manner.79 Justice Scalia adopted a narrow version of this
doctrine that would limit it to technical or drafting errors.80

75. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 24.
76. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 355. They conclude:
Strict constructionism understood as a judicial straightjacket is a long-outmoded
approach deriving from a mistrust of all enacted law . . . . Textualists should
object to being called strict constructionists . . . . [It] is an irretrievably pejorative
term, as it ought to be. Strict constructionism, as opposed to fair-reading
textualism, is not a doctrine to be taken seriously.
Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 355 (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)).
78. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The “literalism” issue is
one way of characterizing much of the disagreement between the Court’s two leading
textualists in the Bostock case. Justice Kavanaugh objected to Justice Gorsuch’s
interpretation of the operative term, writing:
[C]ourts must adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the
meaning of the words in a phrase . . . . The “prime directive in statutory
interpretation is to apply the meaning that a reasonable reader would derive
from the text of the law,” so that “for hard cases as well as easy ones, the ordinary
meaning . . . of the relevant statutory text is the anchor for statutory
interpretation.” . . . [P]roper statutory interpretation asks “how a reasonable
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would
read the text in context. This approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary
definitions of words will often fail to account for settled nuances or
background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of language and, in
particular, of legal language.” . . . Consider a simple example of how ordinary
meaning differs from literal meaning. A statutory ban on “vehicles in the park”
would literally encompass a baby stroller. But no good judge would interpret
the statute that way because the word “vehicle,” in its ordinary meaning, does
not encompass baby strollers.
Id.
79. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 234. Perhaps this explains why Justice
Scalia said, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Nina Totenberg, Justice
Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens up, NPR (Apr. 28, 2008, 7:32 AM), https://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017 [https://perma.cc/UL2Y-HLUK].
80. See id. at 234, 238.
Justice Scalia endorsed the [absurdity doctrine], or at least what he called a
“narrow version” of it. According to the Justice, two conditions must coincide
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These textualist rules of statutory interpretation do not, of course,
mean every textualist will always interpret key words and terms identically.
Indeed, as Jonathan Skrmetti observed, “the three [Supreme Court]
Bostock opinions are a master class in defining and applying textualism.”81
B. Neither Justice Scalia Nor Anyone Else Has Performed a Textualist
Analysis of the Relevant Sherman Act Terms
Unfortunately, neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else has ever
performed a textualist analysis of any of the antitrust laws on the no-fault
issue. Justice Scalia authored five antitrust opinions,82 three concurrences,83
and three dissenting84 opinions in antitrust cases. Most do not even come
close to undertaking a textualist analysis of the no-fault issue.85
Nevertheless, some are instructive illustrations of textualist analysis.

to justify application of the canon. First, the absurdity “must consist of a
disposition that no reasonable person could intend.” More precisely, and
quoting Joseph Story, “the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to
the case [must] be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation,
unite in rejecting the application.” Mere oddity or anomaly does not suffice.
Second, the absurdity must be “reparable by changing or supplying a
particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a
technical or ministerial error.” Satisfaction of these two conditions, the Justice
said, establishes that the apparent anomaly was a drafting error, an error that
changing or applying a particular word corrects.
Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013,
2036 (2017) (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
81. Skrmetti, supra note 6.
82. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc.,
499 U.S. 365 (1991); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
83. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 176 (2004) (Scalia,
J., concurring); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 576 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
84. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
85. Most Scalia decisions did not even come close to undertaking a relevant
textualist analysis. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., concurring); Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S.
at 486 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 333 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365.
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For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,86 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority in part and dissenting in part, performed a
textualist analysis of the term “boycott” as it was used in the McCarranFerguson Act87 exception to the antitrust laws:
Determining proper application of [section] 3(b) of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act to the present cases requires precise definition of the
word “boycott.” It is a relatively new word, little more than a century
old. It was first used in 1880, to describe the collective action taken
against Captain Charles Boycott, an English agent managing various
estates in Ireland . . . . Thus, the verb made from the unfortunate
Captain’s name has had from the outset the meaning it continues to
carry today. To “boycott” means “[t]o combine in refusing to hold
relations of any kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a
neighbour), on account of political or other differences, so as to
punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce him into
abandoning it.”88

Justice Scalia then used the Webster’s Dictionary definition to
resolve a key legal dispute.89 This is significant because it illustrates
Justice Scalia’s use of a roughly contemporaneous dictionary
definitions (he used a 1950 dictionary to define a term in a 1946 law),
a technique that will be discussed below.
The Scalia opinion that would have been most likely to have
undertaken the relevant textualist analysis was Trinko because the case
involved the core meaning of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.90
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s opinion did not undertake a textualist
analysis of the overall meaning of Section 2. He instead simply cited

86. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2018).
88. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 800–01 (quoting 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
468 (2d ed. 1989)) (second alteration in original).
89. 1 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d ed. 1950) (emphasis
added) (defining “boycott” as “to withhold, wholly or in part, social or business
intercourse from, as an expression of disapproval or means of coercion”); see Hartford
Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 801 (citing 1 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra)
(alteration in original) (“As the definition just recited provides, the refusal may be
imposed ‘to punish [the target] for the position he has taken up, or coerce him into
abandoning it.’ . . . Furthermore, other dictionary definitions extend the term to
include a partial boycott—a refusal to engage in some, but not all, transactions with
the target.”).
90. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 401 (explaining the issue as whether the complaint states a claim under Section
2 of the Sherman Act).
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precedent—the United States v. Grinnell Corp.91 case—for his assertion
that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a monopolist that
gains its monopoly through historical accident or superior efficiency.92
Justice Scalia extensively analyzed the term “restraint of trade” in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.93 using a common-law
based textualist analysis,94 but he was not examining the no-fault issue.
Rather, he distinguished the idea of a “restraint of trade” from the
understanding of which specific business practices restrained trade.95
His opinion considered the common law antecedents of modern
antitrust law but did not involve the no-fault issue.96
Finally, although it did not discuss the issue of no-fault monopoly, it
is instructive that in a concurring opinion in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,97
a Robinson-Patman Act98 case, Justice Scalia wrote:
The language of the Act is straightforward: Any price discrimination
whose effect “may be substantially . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition” is prohibited, unless it is immunized by the “cost
justification” defense, i.e., unless it “make[s] only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which [the] commodities

91. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
92. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted) (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–
71) (“The complaint alleges that Verizon denied interconnection services to rivals in
order to limit entry. If that allegation states an antitrust claim at all, it does so under
[Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, which declares that a firm shall not ‘monopolize’ or
‘attempt to monopolize.’ It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’”).
93. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
94. See id. at 731–32 (explaining that common law meaning is important, but
Congress intended the meaning of “restraint of trade” to be dynamic).
95. Id. at 732 (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with
its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”). Justice Scalia also
cited, with apparent approval, a pre-Sherman Act common law case. Id. at 731 (citing
Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889)) (“The changing content of the term
‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”).
96. Id. at 732 (“[T]he common law, both in general and as embodied in the
Sherman Act, does not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier
decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in
error.”).
97. 496 U.S. 543 (1990).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018).
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are . . . sold or delivered.” There is no exception for “reasonable”
functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.99

This textualist discussion is noteworthy because it affirms the “fair or
ordinary reading” conclusion that no exception should be implied in
the law unless it is explicitly a part of the statute. This will be important
infra Section II.B.3 during the discussion of whether Section 2 of the
Sherman Act actually contains an “exception” for monopolies attained
by superior efficiency.
Justice Gorsuch has written one Supreme Court opinion100 and three
Circuit Court opinions that substantively address Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.101 None perform a textualist analysis of the no-fault issue.
The majority opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper102 does include a textualist
analysis by Justice Kavanaugh, but it concerns the statute’s language
concerning a plaintiff’s right to sue, not the issue of no-fault monopoly.103
III. A TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2 DEMONSTRATES IT DOES
NOT REQUIRE FAULT
A. A Textualist Analysis of “Monopolize”
A Justice Scalia-inspired textualist analysis of the Sherman Act’s
approach to the no-fault issue leads to a startling result: courts should
interpret Section 2 to impose sanctions on all monopolies, not just
monopolies acquired by anticompetitive conduct. The Sherman Act
should not contain an exception for efficient monopolists.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone who shall “monopolize[]
or attempt to monopolize.”104 The statute never defines “monopolize,”105
99. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
100. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
101. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013); Kay Elec. Coop.
v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs.
v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2009).
102. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
103. See Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
105. Indeed, it was rare for pre-Sherman Act restraint of trade cases to use the term
“monopolize.” For an exception (which seems to imply a no-fault approach to the
area), see Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (implying a no-fault approach
and asserting that “[c]orporations . . . if allowed to engage without supervision, in
subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to
control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, [ ]
become a public menace . . . .”).
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and uses it in place of the more straightforward term “monopoly.” Did
Congress intend “monopolize” to mean the same thing as “monopoly,”
or was it meant to be a broader or narrower term, or simply to be
different?
The Act’s preamble does use the term “monopolies,” calling the statute
“[a]n act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies.”106 It is unclear, however, whether “unlawful” modifies only
“restraints,” in which case the words of the preamble would tend to condemn
all monopolies, or whether “unlawful” also modifies “monopolies,” which
would be ambiguous. It could mean that all monopolies are illegal, or that
some monopolies are legal.
The overriding question is of course whether the statute’s prohibition
against firms that “monopolize” or “attempt to monopolize” was intended
to encompass only the subset of cases that created a monopoly through
anticompetitive means—the current legal requirement for a Section 2
violation.107 As the next Sections will demonstrate, a “fair meaning” or
textualist approach to Section 2 leads to a simple conclusion: a firm
illegally “monopolizes” if it was a monopoly at the time of the suit, and it
engages in an illegal “attempt to monopolize” if it was in the process of
seriously attempting to acquire a monopoly. The statute contains no
exception for a monopoly acquired through superior efficiency.108
1. Roughly contemporaneous dictionaries
As noted earlier, Justice Scalia was especially interested in the
definitions of key terms in contemporary dictionaries.109 Scalia and
Garner believe that six dictionaries of the 1851 to 1900 period are
“useful and authoritative.”110 We have checked all six for definitions of
106. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2018). Scalia and Garner write that a textualist should consider
such prefatory material: “A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a permissible
indicator of meaning . . . . The title and headings are [also] permissible indicators of
meaning.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 217, 221.
107. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (noting that to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a business must
purposefully acquire dominant market power).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
109. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 415. As noted earlier, immediately after
Scalia and Garner introduce the “fair reading” method, id. at 33, they cite three
sources on guides to statutory interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and
useful sources of meaning, they provide four dictionary definitions of key terms. Id. at
37. Their book also has an appendix titled, “A Note on the Use of Dictionaries.” Id.
app. at 415.
110. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 419, 421.
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“monopolize” and have also checked other dictionaries, including the
Oxford English Dictionary, which Scalia and Garner believe to be
useful and authoritative even though it is from 1908. As will be seen,
the principle definition of each for “monopolize” was simply that a firm
had acquired a monopoly. None require anticompetitive conduct for
a firm to “monopolize” a market.
The then-highly esteemed111 1897 edition of Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia112 defined “monopolize” as: “1. To obtain a monopoly of;
have an exclusive right of trading in: as, to monopolize all the corn in
a district . . . . 2. To obtain or engross the whole of; obtain exclusive
possession of. ‘As if this age had monopolized all goodness to itself.’”113
Serendipitously, a definition of “monopolize” was given in a dictionary
that Scalia and Garner believed to be useful and authoritative that was
cited during the Sherman Act’s legislative debates, just before the final
vote on the Bill.114 As noted in Part I above, Senator Edmunds cited a
dictionary to define the term “monopolize.” Although normally a
textualist would not care about anything uttered during a
congressional debate, Senator Edmund’s remarks surely should be
significant to a textualist because his remarks help a textualist do
exactly what Justice Scalia said we should do: use a dictionary to define
and demonstrate what Congress was doing when it decided to use the
term “monopolize” in the Sherman Act. When Senator Edmunds
noted the meaning of “monopolize” as it was used in a contemporary
Webster’s Dictionary his remarks should be examined not as legislative
history, but rather as a piece of evidence as to common linguistic usage
in 1890:
[T]he best answer I can make to both my friends is to read from
Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the verb “to monopolize”: 1.
To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a commodity or
goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the
exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea . . . . 2. To engross

111. See Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/
print/article/102958 [https://perma.cc/46RM-2426] (describing the Century
Dictionary and Cyclopedia as an American-English dictionary that is “generally
regarded as one of the greatest ever produced” and that even “[l]ong after it went out
of print, [it] remained one of the most valuable references for etymologists,
lexicographers, and historians”).
112. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 419.
113. 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA 3843 (1st ed., New York, The
Century Co. 1897).
114. See 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890).
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or obtain by any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of
trading to any place, or with any country or district . . . .115

This again shows that “monopolize” primarily and fairly meant to
acquire a monopoly.116 The definition was not restricted to acquisitions
of monopoly through anticompetitive conduct.117 It was, moreover,
essentially the same as the definitions in the 1828,118 1898,119 and
1913120 editions of Webster’s Dictionary.
The first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary121 containing the
definition of “monopolize” was published in 1908 (not too long after
115. Id. Since “monopolize” can be defined in part by using the word “engross” it
should be noted that the relevant definition of “engross” given in the 1886 Webster’s
Dictionary is: “4. To purchase either the whole or large quantities of, for the purpose
of making a profit by enhancing the price; hence to take or assume in undue quantity,
proportion, or degree; as to engross commodities in market; to engross power.”
WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 449 (London, George Bell
& Sons 1886).
116. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note
115, at 855.
117. It is, however, possible that the “with the view to” language could excuse an
accidental monopoly. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945), Judge Hand famously thought there could be accidental monopolies, noting
that a monopoly might arise by historic accident or where monopoly had been “thrust
upon” a firm. See id. at 429.
118. See 2 AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 138 (New York, S.
Converse 1828) (Defining “monopolize” as “One that monopolizes; a person who
engrosses a commodity by purchasing the whole of that article in market for the
purpose of selling it at an advanced price; or one who has a license or privilege granted
by authority, for the sole buying or selling of any commodity. The man who retains in
his hands his own produce or manufacture, is not a monopolist within the meaning of
the laws for preventing monopolies.”); id, (defining “monopolize” as: “1. [t]o purchase
or obtain possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in market with the view
of selling them at advanced prices, and of having the power of commanding the prices;
as, to monopolize sugar or tea. 2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right
of trading to any place, and the sole power of vending any commodity or goods in a
particular place or country; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade. 3. To obtain the
whole; as, to monopolize advantages”).
119. WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 540 (Springfield, G. & C. Merriam Co.
1898) (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o have or get a monopoly of”).
120. Monopolize, WEBSTER’S 1913, https://www.websters1913.com/words/Monopolize
[https://perma.cc/2Y5T-6NFW] (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o acquire a monopoly
of; to have or get the exclusive privilege or means of dealing in, or the exclusive
possession of; to engross the whole of; as, to monopolize the coffee trade; to monopolize
land”).
121. This is a dictionary that Scalia and Garner characterize as one of the most
useful and authoritative from the 1901–1950 period. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
40, app. at 422.
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1890 and which therefore might be an accurate guide to usage when
the Sherman Act was passed): “1 . . . . To get into one’s hands the
whole stock of (a particular commodity); to gain or hold exclusive
possession of (a trade); to engross . . . . To have a monopoly. . . . 2 . . . .
To obtain exclusive possession or control of; to get or keep entirely to
oneself.”122 Not only does the Oxford English Dictionary equate
“monopolize” with “monopoly,” but nowhere does this definition mention
a requirement that a monopolist must have engaged in anticompetitive
conduct.123
These definitions are in relevant part identical to the definitions in
four other dictionaries of the period considered reliable by Scalia and
Garner124 and in five other roughly contemporaneous dictionaries as
well.125 In sum, all of the surveyed roughly contemporaneous dictionaries
122. 6 A NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 624 (1st ed. 1908).
123. See id.
124. See 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 113; supra text
accompanying note 115 (citing the 1886 Webster’s Dictionary definition of
“monopolize”).
Stormonth’s dictionary provides a variety of related definitions. JAMES STORMONTH,
ETYMOLOGICAL AND PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 369 (7th ed.,
Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons 1882) (defining “monopolise”
as “[t]o purchase or obtain possession of the whole of anything with the view of selling
at an advanced price and controlling the market; to obtain or engross the whole”;
“monopolising” as “obtaining the sole power or right; engrossing”; and “monopolist”
as “one who has obtained the exclusive power to trade in a certain article, or who has
the command of the market”). Interestingly, its definition of “monopoly” includes not
just purchasing all of an article, but also its manufacturer. See id. (defining “monopoly”
as “ . . . the sole power of selling any article by purchase, by superior manufacture, or
by patent.”
Latham’s dictionary contains a similar definition of monopolize. ROBERT GORDON
LATHAM, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 247 (abridged ed., London,
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1876) (defining “monopolize” similarly as “[e]ngross, so as
to have the sole power or privilege of vending any commodity” and defining
“monopolizer” as “monopolist”); see also 3 UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 3185 (Robert Hunter & Charles Morris eds., New York, Peter Fenelon
Collier 1897) (defining “monopolize” as “1. To obtain or possess a monopoly of; to
have exclusive command over for production, sale, or purchase. 2. To obtain or hold
exclusive possession of; to engross.”); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 927 (Boston, Hickling, Swan, and Brewer 1860) (defining
“monopolize” as “[t]o buy up or obtain possession of the whole of, so as to sell at one’s
own price; to engross the whole of, as of any branch of trade; to obtain a monopoly of;
to forestall”).
125. See JOHN CRAIG, THE UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 184 (London, George
Routledge and Sons 1869) (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o engross so as to have the
sole power, or exclusive privilege of vending any commodity” and “monopolizer” as
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define “monopolize” as simply to gain a monopoly.126 Some definitions
included “with a view of” selling the goods at a higher price—language
that could perhaps create an exception for an accidental monopolist
(assuming they ever exist).127
Since many of these dictionaries gave “engross” as one of the ways in
which a firm could become a monopoly, it is worth noting that this
term had a similar, but more specific, meaning than “monopolize”. For
example, the 1897 Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia defined “engross”
as:
To monopolize the supply of, or the supplies in; get entire
possession or control of, for the purpose of raising prices and
enhancing profits: as, to engross the importations of tea; to engross the
market for wheat . . . . To occupy wholly; take up or employ entirely,
to the exclusion of other things: as, business engrosses his attention
or thoughts; to be engrossed in study.128

Indeed, the five other dictionaries of the period that Scalia and
Garner considered useful and authoritative defined “engross”
similarly—as simply to obtain a monopoly. None of these dictionaries
required otherwise anticompetitive conduct as a part of engrossing
(except of course for the very act of obtaining a monopoly).129 By

“[o]ne who engrosses a commodity by purchasing the entire article, with a view to
enhance the price”); THE NEW EXCELSIOR DICTIONARY 183 (Nashua, C.C. Parker 1889)
(defining “monopolize” as “to engross the whole”); THE AMERICAN POPULAR
DICTIONARY 196 (New York, Hurst & Co. 1879) (defining “monopolize” as “to obtain
or engross the whole”); ROBERT SULLIVAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 179
(Dublin, Alexander Thom & Sons 1854) (defining “monopolize” as “to engross all of
a commodity or business into one’s own hands”).
126. For example, Latham’s dictionary used one example involving anticompetitive
conduct in its definition of “monopolizer”: “There was in it the fraud of some old
patentees and monopolizers in the trade of bookselling.” LATHAM, supra note 124, at 247.
127. See CRAIG, supra note 125, at 184; STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 369.
128. 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA , supra note 113, at 1934. Similarly,
“engrosser” was defined as “[o]ne who takes, or gets control of, the whole; a
monopolizer; specifically, a monopolizer of commodities or a commodity of trade or
business.” Id.
129. See LATHAM, supra note 124, at 481 (defining “engross” as “[s]eize in the gross;
seize, obtain commodity for the sake of selling at a high price; monopolize”);
STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 180 (defining “engross” as “to make great, to increase,
to enlarge—the primary signification being to buy up a commodity in order to increase
the price, to occupy the whole, as the thoughts; to take or assume in undue quantities
or degrees," defining “engrossing” as “the invidious occupation of anything which
ought to be shared with others,” and defining “engrossment” as “the act of
appropriating things in undue quantities.”); 2 UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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analogy, to “engross” is similar to the modern idea of acquiring a
monopoly through merger. If one meaning of “monopolize” in Section
2 is to “engross,” then the statute specifically prohibited attaining a
monopoly through merger.
Crucially, none of the definitions of “monopolize” specifically require
any conduct that we would today characterize as anticompetitive. A few
definitions did give specific examples of how a firm might become a
monopoly by anticompetitive means, or by engrossing (which is similar
to merging), and some used a phrase like “controlling the market”
which is ambiguous as to whether anticompetitive conduct must be
involved.130 Crucially, however, none of these dictionaries exempted
efficient monopolists from the term “monopolize” or specifically
restricted the definition of “monopolize” to a monopoly gained by
anticompetitive conduct. All of the dictionary definitions of the period
therefore support a no-fault characterization of Section 2.
2. Roughly contemporaneous legal dictionaries and legal treatises
We did not find “monopolize” defined in any of the eight 1851 to
1900 legal dictionaries and treatises characterized by Scalia and Garner
as “useful and authoritative.”131 The only available contemporary legal
treatise that define “monopolize” contain virtually the same definition
of the term as was found in the dictionaries of the period. This can be
seen in Green’s legal treatise from 1889, which itself cited Webster’s
dictionary:
To monopolize, as defined by Webster, is, 1. To purchase or obtain
possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in the market,
with the view of selling them at advanced prices, and of having the
power to command the prices. 2. To engross or obtain by any means
LANGUAGE, supra note 124, at 1887 (defining “engross” as to “buy up the whole or large
quantities of any commodity with the object of controlling the market, and thus being
able to sell again at an enhanced price”); WORCESTER, supra note 124, at 485 (defining
“engross” as “[t]o buy up in large quantities in order to raise a demand and sell again
at a higher price; to forestall; to monopolize” and defining “engrossing” as “[t]he act
or the practice of buying up or forestalling”); supra note 115 (citing the 1886 Webster’s
Dictionary definition of “engross”).
Although the term “engrossing” was mostly concerned with monopolizing commodities,
it surely would also encompass becoming a monopoly through a series of mergers of
companies owning the goods in question.
130. See STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 369. “Controlling the market” is ambiguous
because it could be simply a description of a monopoly, or it could imply anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct.
131. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, app. at 421.
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the exclusive right of trading to any place, and the sole power of
vending any commodity or goods in a particular place or country.132

See also the “useful and authoritative” 1897 edition of Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, which did not directly define “monopolize” but effectively
defined the term when it discussed a related term, “forestalling the
market” in a manner that did not require anticompetitive conduct:
In the United States forestalling the market takes the form of
“corners” or of “trusts,” which are attempts by one person or a
conspiracy or combination of persons to monopolize an article of trade
or commerce, or to control or regulate, or to restrict its manufacture or
production in such a manner as to enhance the price.133

Other roughly contemporaneous legal dictionaries such as Black’s
Law Dictionary defined “engrossing”134 and “monopoly,” but not
132. SANFORD MOON GREEN, CRIME: ITS NATURE, CAUSES, TREATMENT, AND
PREVENTION 308–09 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company 1889); see also 1
MARSHALL D. EWELL, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW 517–18 (Boston, The Boston Book
Company 1889) (defining “engrossing” and “monopolies” using terms similar to those
in Webster’s Dictionary).
133. See 1 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (Boston, The Boston Book Company
1897). Bouvier’s 1856 edition also defined a similar term, “engrosser,” as not requiring
anticompetitive conduct. See 1 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed., Philadelphia,
Childs & Peterson 1856) (defining an “engrosser” as “[o]ne who purchases large
quantities of any commodities in order to have the command of the market, and to
sell them again at high prices”).
134. See Engrossing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed., St. Paul, West Publishing Co.
1891) (citation omitted) (defining “engrossing” in English law as “The getting into
one’s possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead victuals, with
intent to sell them again. The total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent to
sell it at an unreasonable price. This was a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and
imprisonment.” and defining “engross” in “old criminal law” as “To buy up so much of a
commodity on the market as to obtain a monopoly and sell again at a forced price.”).
Two other law dictionaries in the Scalia and Garner list provide similar definitions.
See WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 402 (Chicago, T.H. Flood and
Company 1889) (defining “engross” as “At common law the offense of engrossing was
the getting into one's possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn [grain] or
other dead victuals, with intent to sell them again. An injury to the public. If permitted,
one or more men could raise the price of provisions at will. The total engrossing of
any other commodity, with intent to sell it at an unreasonable price, was also an
indictable offense." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)); J. KENDRICK KINNEY, A
LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 282 (Chicago, Callaghan and Company 1893)
(defining “engross” as “to buy up any commodity in large quantities, so as to obtain a
monopoly, with an intent to sell it at an unreasonable price” and defining “engrossing”
in English law as “[t]he buying up of large quantities of grain or other dead victuals,
with intent to sell again; the total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent to
sell it at an unreasonable price”).
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“monopolize.”135 None of these definitions required a monopoly to have
been formed in part or in whole through the use of anticompetitive
conduct.
3. Roughly contemporaneous antitrust cases
Pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases must be interpreted
with caution because the legal standards were changing. As Professor
Letwin concluded:
[A]s a federal judge observed . . . [in 1892,] the English common
law on monopolies had for some years been drifting toward greater
leniency while “in the United States there is a tendency to revive,
with the aid of legislation, the strict rules of the common law against
all forms of monopoly or engrossing.”136

135. See Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 134 (“A privilege or peculiar
advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive
right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular
article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a particularly commodity.”). Even its
1910 edition did not define “monopolize.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (2d ed.
1910); see also 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.), supra note 133, at 186 (defining
“monopoly” but not “monopolize”); 2 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND
GLOSSARY 207–08 (2d ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1870) (same). Two
contemporary legal dictionaries favored by Scalia and Garner also define “monopoly.”
See 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 253 (15th ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co.
1883) (“The abuse of free commerce by which one or more individuals have procured
the advantage of selling alone all of a particular kind of merchandise, to the detriment
of the public . . . . A patent for a useful invention, under the United States laws, is not,
in the old sense of the common law, a monopoly[] . . . .”); 2 STEWART RAPALJE &
ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 834–35 (Jersey City,
Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1883) (“§ 1. A license or privilege allowed by the sovereign
for the sole buying and selling, making, working, or using of anything whatsoever . . . .
§ 2. The popular meaning of ‘monopoly’ at the present day seems to be, the sole power
(or a power largely in excess of that possessed of others) of dealing in some particular
commodity, or at some particular place or market; or of carrying on some particular
business. It is generally obtained by engrossing the market or the getting up of a
‘corner’ in the thing proposed to be made the subject-matter of the monopoly.”).
136. William Letwin, The First Decade of The Sherman Act: Judicial Interpretation, 68 YALE
L.J. 900, 904 (1959) (quoting Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 F. 562, 566 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892)).
After Congress enacted the Sherman Act, lower court cases came down on both sides
of the no-fault issue. See id. at 901–05 (discussing early cases arising under the Sherman
Act). For example, a district court in Louisiana held in 1891 that the concern of
Section 2 was simply whether the defendant held a monopoly. See Am. Biscuit & Mfg.
Co. v. Klotz, 44 F. 721, 724–25 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891) (per curiam) (“[T]he law-maker
has used the word [monopolize] to mean ‘to aggregate’ or ‘concentrate’ in the hands
of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according to the known results of
human action, to the exclusion of others . . . . Now it is to be observed that these
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Moreover, the pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases are of
limited relevance because we found only one that used the term
“monopolize” (it did so in a manner consistent with a no-fault approach).137
Some common law cases stated that if entry was easy, a firm could not be a
“monopoly,”138 but others did not.139
The Supreme Court decided six Sherman Act cases in the decade after
the law went into effect.140 The overriding lesson of these cases is that
these opinions are not helpful in determining whether “monopolize” in
Section 2 requires anticompetitive conduct. The lower court decisions of
the period sometimes did, however, require anticompetitive conduct.141

statutes outline an offense, but require for its complete commission no ulterior motive,
such as to defraud, etc . . . .”). The district court thus appeared to expressly reject the
need for anticompetitive conduct. See id. at 725 (“The offense is defined . . . [as] ‘to
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, any of the trade or commerce.’ To compass
either of these things, with no other motive than to compass them, and by any means,
constitutes the offense.”).
137. Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (“Corporations . . . if allowed
to engage without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if
permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in
which they are engaged, [ ] become a public menace . . . .” (emphasis added)).
138. See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) (“But the
business is open to all others, and there is little danger that the public will suffer harm
from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry. Such contracts do not create
monopolies.”); Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (“That is
certainly a new kind of monopoly which only secures the plaintiff in the exclusive
enjoyment of his business as against a single individual, while all the world beside are
left at full liberty to enter upon the same enterprise.”); Att’y Gen. v. Consol. Gas Co.
of N.Y., 108 N.Y.S. 823, 825 (App. Div. 1908) (“In no sense can the consolidation of
the lighting companies in the city of New York into a single corporation be said to
create such a monopoly for it gains thereby no exclusive right. The field is still open
to any other company that can obtain the necessary consents from the constituted
authorities, and neither the production nor the price can be arbitrarily fixed by the
Consolidated Company.”); Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861, 863
(Gen. Term. 1889) (“But the business is open to all others, and there is little danger
that the public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry.
Such contracts do not create monopolies.”).
139. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876); Cravens v. Rodgers, 14 S.W.
106, 107–08 (Mo. 1890); Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 98 S.W. 805, 812 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1906); Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 56 N.Y.S. 288, 290 (App. Div. 1899).
140. See Letwin, supra note 136, at 914, 928. Letwin includes In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895), but In re Debs is actually about the prosecution’s use of an alternative to a
Sherman Act proceeding. Id. at 911–14.
141. See, e.g., In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (“[A]n ‘attempt to
monopolize’ . . . must be an attempt to secure or acquire an exclusive right in such
trade or commerce by means which prevent or restrain others from engaging
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It should, however, be instructive that these very early Supreme
Court cases sometimes used the terms “monopolize” and “monopoly”
interchangeably.142 Although none of the early Supreme Court cases
explicitly said that Section 2 did not require anticompetitive conduct, by
equating these two terms, they implicitly support a no-fault approach.
For example, United States v. E.C. Knight Co.143 was concerned with
firms that became a “monopoly” and implied that the Sherman Act
regulated every monopoly.144 Significantly, the Court characterized the
defendant as a “monopoly” that had “monopolized,” even though it
only had 98% of the market.145 The Court also held that “all the
authorities agree that in order to vitiate a contract or combination it is
not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly, it is
sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive the public of the
advantages which flow from free competition.”146 In this expansive
holding, the Court thus held that a company violated Section 2 by
simply being a monopoly, and that it did not need to have 100% of the
relevant market.147

therein.”). In addition, complaints or indictments that failed to allege exclusionary
acts were dismissed for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., United States v. Greenhut, 50
F. 469, 469–70 (D. Mass. 1892) (dismissing a claim notwithstanding allegations that
the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company controlled 75% of all the distilled spirits
manufactured and sold within the United States and increased prices). For a slightly
later case, see Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903). Id. at 462–63
(noting that while the Sherman Act clearly prohibits clear attempts to monopolize
where “the necessary effect . . . is to stifle or to directly and substantially restrict
competition in commerce,” monopolies arising in the natural course of competitive
commercial markets cannot be illegal “because such attempts are indispensable to the
existence of any competition in commerce among the states”).
142. See infra notes 148–51.
143. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
144. See id. at 11 (“The fundamental question is, whether conceding that the
existence of a monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly
can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode attempted by this
bill . . . .”). See generally Richard O. Zerbe, The American Sugar Refining Company, 1887–
1914: The Story of a Monopoly, 12 J.L. & ECON. 339, 339 (1969) (discussing the “formation
and aspects of the operation . . . of the American sugar monopoly”).
145. Id. at 3 (noting that the American Sugar Refining Company controlled all U.S.
sugar refineries except for Revere of Boston, which produced 2% of all refined sugar).
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id.
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Most of the other early Supreme Court cases, such as United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,148 Anderson v. United States,149 and Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,150 also appeared to use the terms
“monopolize” and “monopoly” interchangeably.151 The remaining
early cases, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n152 and Hopkins v. United
States,153 were silent on the issue. In addition, Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States154 and the cases it cited, like E.C. Knight, seemed to
use the term “monopoly” to even include markets where the defendant
did not possess 100% of the market.155
If these very early Supreme Court cases had clearly stated that a
monopolization violation required anticompetitive conduct (if they
had stated, for example, that, “It is well established that the word
‘monopolize’ in Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires anticompetitive
conduct for a violation”) we would have to reconcile these statements

148. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
149. 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
150. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
151. See id. at 237 (“But this certainly does not take the contract of association out
of the annulling effect of the rule against monopolies.”); Anderson, 171 U.S. at 619 (“If
all engaged in the business were to become members of the association, yet, as the
association itself does no business, it can and does monopolize none.”); Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 299–301 (using the term “monopolized” to describe a
monopoly).
152. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
153. 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
154. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
155. See id. at 33, 70, 73–74. A pre-Sherman Act case, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1876), essentially equated monopoly and “virtual” monopoly. Id. at 131–32.
(“[S]omething had occurred which led the whole body of the people to suppose that
remedies such as are usually employed to prevent abuses by virtual monopolies might
not be inappropriate here.”). A slightly later Supreme Court case, Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), is difficult to interpret on this point. The Supreme Court,
per Justice Holmes, sustained an injunction entered in connection with the
defendants’ violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 398. Holmes noted
an allegation in the petition pertaining to the Section 2 charge:
By force of the consequent inability of competitors to engage or continue in
such commerce [due to defendants’ use of rebates from railroads and other
devices], the defendants are attempting to monopolize, have monopolized,
and will monopolize the commerce in live stock and fresh meats among the
States and Territories, and with foreign countries . . . .
Id. at 392. The alleged rebates were exclusionary acts, but it is difficult to ascertain the
extent to which Holmes relied on this allegation to sustain the Section 2 charge. His
primary focus was on the conspiracy among the defendants. Id.
The authors are grateful to Dale Collins for this insight.
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with the absence of an anticompetitive conduct requirement in the
contemporary dictionary definitions of “monopolize.” But as Section
IV.A below demonstrates, not until 1966 did the Supreme Court state
in a relatively clear manner that Section 2 requires anticompetitive
conduct.156 All of this suggests or is at least consistent with a no-fault
interpretation of Section 2 as it was drafted.
It might seem astonishing to many 21st century observers that in
1890, Congress passed a law that fairly should be read as being
designed to impose sanctions on monopolies without inquiring into
whether they engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This sentiment can,
however, be seen today in the views of Senators Sanders, Warren, and
others, who have called for the break-up of a large number of alleged
monopolies, including Facebook, Google, and Amazon, without
inquiring into whether they have engaged in anticompetitive
conduct.157 It should not be surprising that the no-fault sentiment
existed at other points in our nation’s history as well.
B. A Textualist Analysis of “Attempt” To Monopolize
A textualist interpretation of Section 2 also should analyze the word
“attempt” as it was used during the 1890 period to gain understanding
as to what Congress meant by the “attempt to monopolize” offense.
However, no unexpected or counterintuitive result comes from this
examination. Around 1890 “attempt” had its colloquial 21st Century
meaning. There was no requirement that an “attempt” to monopolize
needed anticompetitive conduct.
The “useful and authoritative” 1897 Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia’s defines “attempt” thusly: “1. To make an effort to effect or
do; endeavor to perform; undertake; essay: as, to attempt a bold flight . . . .
2. To venture upon: as, to attempt the sea.— 3. To make trial of; prove;
test . . . . 4. To try with afflictions. 5. To endeavor to obtain or attract.”158
156. See infra note 176. The ambiguous 1945 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
opinion also can be read to require anticompetitive conduct. See infra note 184.
157. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (discussing calls to break up
present-day technology trusts).
158. See 1 CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 113, at 371 (citation
omitted). Three other contemporary legal treatises Scalia and Garner deemed reliable
have a similar definition. See KINNEY, supra note 133, at 81 (defining “attempt” as “[a]n
act of endeavor to do a particular thing, with intent, by means of that act in whole or
in part, to do it; more particularly an act of endeavor to commit some offense, carried
beyond mere preparation, but falling short of actual commission”); see also 1 BENJ.
VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH
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The 1898 Webster’s Dictionary gives a similar definition:
Attempt . . . 1. To make trial or experiment of; to try. 2. To try to move,
subdue, or overcome, as by entreaty. 3. To attack; to make an effort or
attack upon . . . .’ An essay, trial, or endeavor; an undertaking; an attack,
or an effort to gain a point.159

The 1913 edition of Webster contains a similar definition.160 These
definitions are essentially identical to its modern definition of
“attempt”.161 The 1888 Oxford English Dictionary similarly reads: “1. A
putting forth of effort to accomplish what is uncertain or difficult; a
trial, essay, endeavour; effort, enterprise, undertaking”.162

JURISPRUDENCE 106 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1879) (defining “attempt” as
“[t]o endeavor; to try to accomplish . . . . an effort or endeavor; some act tending
towards the accomplishment of a purpose which exceeds a mere intent or design or
preparation, and falls short of an execution of it. Usually spoken, in jurisprudence, of
acts tending towards perpetration of offences.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
134 (citation omitted) (defining “attempt” in criminal law as “An effort or endeavor
to accomplish a crime, amounting to more than mere preparation or planning for it,
and which, if not prevented, would have resulted in the full consummation of the act
attempted, but which, in fact, does not bring to pass the party's ultimate design. An
intent to do a particular criminal thing combined with an act which falls short of the
thing intended. There is a marked distinction between “attempt” and “intent”. The
former conveys the idea of physical effort to accomplish an act; the latter, the quality
of mind with which an act was done. To charge, in an indictment, an assault with an
attempt to murder, is not equivalent to charging an assault with intent to murder.”).
159. WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 119, at 62.
160. Attempt, WEBSTER’S 1913, supra note 120 (“A[n] essay, trial, or endeavor; an
undertaking; an attack, or an effort to gain a point; esp. an unsuccessful, as contrasted
with a successful, effort . . . . Attempt to commit a crime (Law), such an intentional
preparatory act as will apparently result, if not extrinsically hindered, in a crime which
it was designed to effect. [Synonyms include,] Endeavor, Effort, Exertion, Trial. These
words agree in the idea of calling forth our powers into action . . . . An attempt is always
directed to some definite and specific object . . . . [T]o try; to endeavor to do or
perform (some action); to assay; as, to attempt to sing; to attempt a bold flight.”).
161. Attempt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attempt
[https://perma.cc/X5HH-H9VE] (defining “attempt” as “to make an effort to do,
accomplish, solve, or effect”); see also Attempt, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12765?rskey=WdNqpF&result=1&isAdvanced=fals
e#eid (defining “attempt” as “[a] putting forth of effort to accomplish what is
uncertain or difficult; a trial, essay, endeavour; effort, enterprise, undertaking”).
162. 1 A NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 547 (1st ed.,
Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888). In its first edition, the Oxford English Dictionary was
published in “fascicles,” mini-volumes that would contain one or a few letters. OED
editions, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://public.oed.com/history/oed-editions/
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However, the word “attempt” in a statute had a specific meaning
under the common law circa 1890. It meant “an intent to do a
particular criminal thing, with an act toward it falling short of the thing
intended.”163 Although one definition stated that the act needed to be
“sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, to
be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with
things trivial and small.”164 None defined the magnitude or nature of
the necessary acts with great specificity (indeed, this task might well be
impossible). However, it is noteworthy that in 1881 Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote about the attempt doctrine in his celebrated treatise,
The Common Law:
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line . . . the
considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. When a
man buys matches to fire a haystack . . . there is still a considerable
chance that he will change his mind before he comes to the point.
But when he has struck the match . . . there is very little chance that
he will not persist to the end . . . .165

#first-edition [https://perma.cc/A8J2-536H]. The volume containing the letter “A” was
published in 1888, while the volume containing the letter “M” was not published until
1908. Id.
163. 6 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 728 (6th ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1877).
164. Id.; see also SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (Cincinnati,
Robert Clarke & Co. 1883) (“An attempt may be said to be the doing of any of the acts
which must be done in succession before the desired object can be
accomplished . . . .”); FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, HEARD ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 385 (2d ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1882) (“An attempt to commit a crime is an act
done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would
constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted.”); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 39 (5th ed., London, Macmillan and Co. 1894) (“An
attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that crime, and
forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were
not interrupted.”); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, ELEMENTARY LAW § 472 (Boston, Little,
Brown, and Company 1882) (“An [a]ttempt consists in the intent to commit a crime,
combined with the doing of some act adapted to, but falling short of, its actual
commission . . . . The act done must be, in its nature, adapted to accomplish the crime
intended.”).
165. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 68–69 (Boston, Little, Brown,
and Company 1881); see also WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1st
ed., St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894) (footnote omitted) (“An attempt to commit a
crime is an act done with intent to commit that particular crime, and forming part of
a series of acts which will apparently, if not interrupted by circumstances independent
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It was clear, however, that acts constituting mere preparation or
planning were insufficient.166
Congress’s choice of the phrase “attempt to monopolize” surely built
upon the existing common definitions of an “attempt” to commit robbery
and other crimes.167 It implies that Congress intended a meaning of “attempt
to monopolize” different from the current requirements of the offense.
Although the meaning of a criminal “attempt” to violate a law may have

of the doer’s will, constitute its actual commission. [ ] The act must be such as would
be proximately connected with the completed crime.”).
166. See BISHOP, supra note 162, § 728 (describing the act as “sufficient both in
magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law
that does not concern itself with things trivial and small”); LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE
LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 266 (2d ed. 1904) (footnote omitted) (“In
order to constitute the offense of attempt, there must be an act in the nature of a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense and, concurrent with such act, an
actual purpose, or specific design, to commit the particular crime . . . . It is sufficient
that one step be taken towards the commission of the contemplated crime; but mere
preparation or planning is insufficient.”); EDWARD LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1828) (defining
“attempt” as “an endeavor to accomplish [an offense], which has failed from some
other cause than the voluntary relinquishment of the design”); JOHN WILDER MAY, THE
LAW OF CRIMES § 29 (1st ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1881) (stating that
to constitute attempt, “it is necessary that some act should be done in the pursuance
of the intent, immediately and directly tending to the commission of the crime; an act
which, should the crime be perpetrated, would constitute part and parcel of the
transaction, but which does not reach to the accomplishment of the original intent”);
JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 18 (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and
Company 1893) (footnote omitted) (“An attempt is an act done in part execution of
a design to commit a crime. There must be an intent that a crime shall be committed,
and an act done, not in full execution, but in pursuance, of the intent.”); EMLIN
MCCLAIN, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 84–85 (Iowa City, Emlin McClain
1883) (“[A] criminal attempt is an intent to commit a specific crime, coupled with an
act adapted to the commission of that crime which the law regards as sufficiently
tending to its accomplishment to be a part of it, without, in itself, being the
consummation of the crime.”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 561 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. and Brother 1846) (defining a
person guilty of attempt as “[e]very person who shall attempt to commit an offense
prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such
offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or shall be intercepted or prevented in the
execution of the same.”).
167. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905), Justice Holmes noted
the common law origin of the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction
between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law.”
The authors are grateful to Marc Winerman for suggesting this research issue.
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evolved since the common law formulations presented above,168 a
textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” prong of Section 2
would move it a considerable way back towards the common law
approach to the “attempt” doctrine. Attempted monopolization should
require the intent to take over a market, planning and preparation, and
at least one serious act in furtherance of this plan. But attempted
monopolization should not require anticompetitive conduct.
C. No Exceptions Should Be Implied for Monopolization or Attempts to
Monopolize Not Accompanied by Anticompetitive Conduct
These definitions of “monopolize” and “attempt to monopolize”
include all monopolies, even those acquired by luck or superior
efficiency. Like the actual text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
definitions contain no exceptions.
Moreover, as Justice Scalia reminded us in Texaco Inc., no exception
should be read into a statute unless, of course, it is explicitly contained in
the statute.169 Justice Gorsuch similarly noted in Bostock, “[U]nexpected
applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s ‘presumed point
[to] produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to
recognize ad hoc exceptions.’”170 Moreover, one of the earliest antitrust

168. The adoption of the Model Penal Code may have changed the classic
definition of attempt. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 11.4(e) (1986); 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 704 (15th ed. 1996). The Model Penal
Code’s formulation, now adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, requires “an act or
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
in [the actor’s] commission of the crime.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(c) (AM. L. INST.
1962). The substantial step must be “strongly corroborative” of the defendant’s
criminal purpose. Id. § 5.01(2). The Model Penal Code enumerates several examples
of a “substantial step,” including “lying in wait,” “search[ing] for or following the
contemplated victim of the crime,” and “enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated
victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission.” Id.
169. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I
cannot, however, adopt the Court’s reasoning, which seems to create an exemption
for functional discounts that are ‘reasonable’ even though prohibited by the text of
the Act . . . . The language of the Act is straightforward[] . . . . There is no exception
for ‘reasonable’ functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.”). It is
difficult to speculate how far Justice Scalia would have taken his belief that no
exemptions should be implied. For example, the Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act was not meant to apply to the activities of states. See Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 351 (1943). Should this statutory exemption not have been implied?
170. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 101).
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cases, Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, explicitly held that no exceptions to
the antitrust statutes should be implied:
[W]e are asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation an
exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the
Government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the
impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be supposed
Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This
we cannot and ought not to do . . . . If the act ought to read as
contended for by defendants, Congress is the body to amend it and not
this [C]ourt, by a process of judicial legislation wholly unjustifiable.171

Since the text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not contain an
express exemption for monopolies and attempts to monopolies
unaccompanied by anticompetitive conduct, none should be implied or
imposed by courts today.
IV. CASES WHERE THE SUPREME COURT HAS DRAMATICALLY REINTERPRETED A STATUTE AFTER A LONG PERIOD
A. The Vagueness of Pre-Trinko Section 2 Law
There is no doubt that in 2004 the Supreme Court in Trinko clearly
interpreted Section 2 of the Sherman Act as requiring that a firm
engage in anticompetitive conduct to violate Section 2.172 Scalia’s
majority opinion also contained much more praise for monopolies
than had ever before appeared in a Supreme Court decision.173
Moreover, many agree with Justice Scalia that clear opinions deserve
more stare decisis deference than ambiguous opinions.174
Trinko was different in tone and clarity, and arguably even in its
overall holding, from not only the Section 2 cases decided during the
1890s and analyzed above in Section III.A.3, but also from the then171. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897); see also
id. at 328 (“[N]o exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that
which has been omitted by [C]ongress.”).
172. See supra notes 90–92.
173. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004) (describing “monopoly” as “an important element of the free-market
system” and stating that it “produces innovation and economic growth”).
174. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2129, n.40 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); see also
Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential
Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2013) (noting the value of stare decisis stems
from the “benefits of clarity and predictability [that] can outweigh the costs of having
each judge, in each different case, develop and apply different sets of rules”).

536

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:497

existing monopolization standard from the 1966 decision in the United
States v. Grinnell Corp. case.175 Grinnell merely held that a willfully
acquired or maintained or “consciously acquired” monopoly should be
condemned “as distinguished from [a monopoly acquired] as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.”176 Grinnell usually is read to require anticompetitive conduct,177
and the Court in Grinnell found that the defendant in that case had
engaged in “unlawful and exclusionary” behavior.178 The Grinnell
Court, however, never explicitly held that a Section 2 violation always
requires anticompetitive conduct.
Indeed, Professor Donald Turner interpreted Grinnell to be
ambiguous on the no-fault issue because it failed to properly
“distinguish between ‘exclusionary’ conduct and ‘skill, foresight and
industry.’”179 Turner found the Court’s formulation unhelpful because
“[a]ny highly successful competitive strategy tends to confer market
power and tends to ‘exclude’ competitors, and everyone who engages
in such strategy knows this; thus, power obtained and maintained by
any highly successful competitive strategy is ‘will[]fully’ acquired.”180
Turner stated: “I have come to believe . . . that courts can fairly be
asked to extend the scope of the Sherman Act’s application . . . to
single-firm monopoly beyond what past precedents, except possibly
Alcoa, have reached.”181 Ultimately, however, Turner concluded

175. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense
of monopoly under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”).
176. Id. at 570–71, 576 n.7. Note 7 states:
Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was consciously
acquired, we have no reason to reach the further position of the District Court
that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on the defendants
to show that their dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like.
Id. at 576 n.7.
177. See id. at 570–71; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50, 58
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Grinnell’s elements and reading it as requiring anticompetitive
conduct).
178. Id. (“[A]s the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was achieved in
large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices.”).
179. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1969).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1217.
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Grinnell suggested that monopoly “solely attributable to accident”
should not be an offense.182 This approach was included in the 1978
Areeda-Turner treatise, which advocated monopolization without a
demonstration of fault, with important qualifications that made their
proposal closer to a presumption of illegality than to true no-fault.183
Similarly, the immediately prior relevant Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Griffith,184 was also somewhat ambiguous on the fault
issue:
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain
trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws
have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or
monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant’s conduct or
business arrangements. To require a greater showing would cripple
the [Sherman] Act.185

The Court then continued with an ambiguous quote from Swift &
Co. v. United States186:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which
the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.187

Similarly, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,188 a conspiracy to
monopolize case, the Court held that “[n]either proof of exertion of the
power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential
182. Id. at 1219.
183. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147,
163 n.55 (2005) (discussing the Areeda-Turner proposal and noting it has not been
adopted by any court).
184. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
185. Id. at 105 (citations omitted). The opinion continued: “As stated in United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, ‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing.’ Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is necessary
only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act.” Id. (citations
omitted); see also id. at 107 (citation omitted) (“So it is that monopoly power, whether
lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned
under [Section] 2 even though it remains unexercised. For [Section] 2 of the Act is
aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective market control. Hence the
existence of power ‘to exclude competition when it is desired to do so’ is itself a
violation of [Section] 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise
that power.”).
186. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
187. Id. at 396.
188. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under
the Sherman Act.”189 Two years later, the Court in Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. United States190 read United States v. Aluminum Co. of America191 (Alcoa)
as holding that “[t]he mere existence of the power to monopolize,
together with the purpose or intent to do so, constitutes an evil at which
the Act is aimed.”192
One could reasonably conclude that the Grinnell and Griffith Courts—
in opinions written by Justice Douglas, certainly no fan of monopolies—
were being deliberately vague and arguably self-contradictory.193
Perhaps Justice Douglas was knowingly and deliberately preserving the
ambiguity of the then-prevailing Alcoa standard,194 which could be read
either as requiring fault, as not requiring fault, or as a cleverly disguised
no-fault standard.195
189. Id. at 810.
190. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
191. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
192. Schine Chain, 334 U.S. at 130.
193. See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text.
194. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429.
195. Id. at 431–32. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), the Second Circuit described the Alcoa decision as “cryptic” and “a litigant’s
wishing well, into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything
he wishes.” Id. at 273. The court continued to explain the contradictory nature of Alcoa:
“Having stated that Congress ‘did not condone “good trusts” and condemn “bad” ones;
it forbad[e] all,’ [Judge Learned Hand] declared with equal force, ‘The successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan criticized Alcoa in an essay
published in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. Alan Greenspan, Antitrust, in CAPITALISM:
THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 63, 71 (Ayn Rand ed., 1966). His criticism was in part because he
believed that it was a no-fault case: “ALCOA is being condemned for being too
successful, too efficient, and too good a competitor.” Id. See generally William E. Kovacic
& Marc Weinerman, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant Application of the Sherman
Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295 (2013) (“[C]onsistent with Hand’s philosophy of legislative
interpretation, the decision sought to implement [c]ongressional intent as Hand
perceived it—and that intent was sufficiently clear, Hand believed, that the public
would ‘quite rightly, write us down as asses’ unless the panel found a [S]ection 2
violation.”); see also id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Judge Hand as stating,
“There are two possible ways of dealing with [monopolies]: to regulate, or to forbid,
them. Since we have no way of regulating them, we forbid them. I don’t think much
of that way, but I didn’t set it up.”). It seems likely that Judge Hand wrote his opinion
in a manner that was deliberately ambiguous on the anticompetitive conduct issue
because Hand’s fair or plain reading of the statute (the term “textualism” didn’t exist
in 1945) convinced him that Section 2 was supposed to be a no-fault statute. Hand
might well have been nervous that the Supreme Court would not accept this
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As noted earlier, when Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Trinko,
he did not undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2.196 He simply
cited precedent for his assertion that the Sherman Act contains an
exception for a monopolist that gained its monopoly through superior
efficiency.197
Nevertheless, the pro-monopoly tone of Justice Scalia’s language in
Trinko went much further than that of any other Supreme Court
monopolization opinion.198 Elsewhere Justice Scalia has denounced
the type of expansion of precedent he undertook in Trinko.199 We can
only speculate why Justice Scalia avoided undertaking a textualist
analysis in Trinko, but instead used the opportunity to move the law of
monopolization even further away from the result that should follow
from a textualist approach.
B. Overturning Old Statutory Precedent
Justice Brandeis articulated the general criteria courts employ to
guide their use of the doctrine of stare decisis:
Stare decisis is not[] . . . [an] inexorable command . . . . Stare decisis is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . . ,

interpretation—so he obfuscated. This “fair reading” of Section 2 would explain much
of the self-contradictory Alcoa opinion. See Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft
and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993) (describing Justice
Cardozo’s oft-used strategy of modifying the law by writing ambiguous interim
opinions, which evaded easy criticism, and then building on them).
196. See supra Section III.A.
197. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966))
(“It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.’”).
198. Compare supra Section III.A.3 (quoting language from various monopoly cases
that is less effusive towards monopolies), with Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The mere
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is
not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct.”).
199. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 77 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(decrying “sub silentio expansion” of substantive precedent).
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even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction
can be had by legislation.200

More recently, the Court noted a specific complexity relating to
antitrust: “[S]tare decisis [has] less-than-usual force in cases involving
the Sherman Act,”201 which gives courts “exceptional law-shaping
authority.”202 The Court explained: “We have [ ] felt relatively free to
revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to
reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive
consequences.”203 This is consistent with an explanation in State Oil Co.
v. Khan204 as to why stare decisis matters less in antitrust cases:
[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of
the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape
to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.” . . . [This] Court [ ] reconsider[s] its decisions construing
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those
decisions are called into serious question.205

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.206 might have gone
even a step further, stating that “[s]tare decisis is not as significant . . .
because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act.”207
Moreover, though the Supreme Court had twice declined to overturn

200. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–06 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
201. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412 (2015); see also Barak
Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Oct. 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct1
5_orbach_10_19f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK4W-BUTM] (noting that
“Kimble declared that the Court is more willing to overrule antitrust precedents than
other precedents”).
202. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2413.
203. Id. at 2412–13. Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the
challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its
understanding of economics. Id. at 2412.
204. 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
205. Id. at 20–21.
206. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
207. Id. at 899. However, as Barak Orbach points out, this is not always the case. See
Orbach, supra note 200, at 8–9 (noting that some antitrust precedent “[is] truly
anomalous, yet enjoy[s] ‘a super-strong presumption of correctness.’ Two key
examples are the baseball exemption and the filed-rate doctrine . . . . Neither doctrine
can be justified other than by the reluctance of the Court to overrule it”).
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the 1911 precedent implicated in Leegin,208 Justice Scalia—despite
joining the Court in those instances—ultimately ignored that history in
Leegin, where he joined Justice Kennedy in the Court’s rebuke of stare
decisis.209
Supreme Court precedent, even sixteen years old—such as the opinion
by Justice Scalia in Trinko, which unequivocally held that Section 2
requires anticompetitive conduct—certainly deserves deference, and
should not be overturned lightly. A fortiori, a precedent fifty-four years
old, such as Grinnell, deserves even more respect under stare decisis.
However, Grinnell deserves less deference because it is ambiguous.210
The longest period after which the Supreme Court dramatically reinterpreted the Sherman Act apparently was ninety-six years, when
Leegin overturned the holding in the 1911 case, Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co.211 decision concerning the legal status of
resale price maintenance (“RPM”).212 Dr. Miles has been interpreted by
the Court as making RPM per se illegal,213 but in 2007, the Court
changed the legal standard to rule of reason.214
The Court did not make this change, however, because it acknowledged
it had misread the Sherman Act. Rather, the basis of its reasoning
concerned evolving or changing economic learning surrounding how

208. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–82 (overturning Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
209. See id. at 880. Interestingly, on other occasions, Justice Scalia gave more weight
to precedent. Scalia and Garner wrote: “If a statute uses words or phrases that have
already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or
even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency,
they are to be understood according to that construction.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 38, at 322.
210. See Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1921, 1935 (2017) (“While he did not think that specific dispositions were set in stone,
he thought that the Court should ‘retain [its] ability . . . sometimes to adopt new
principles for the resolution of new issues without abandoning clear holdings of the
past that those principles contradict.’”).
211. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
212. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877, 882.
213. Id. at 887 (noting that “[t]he Court has interpreted [Dr. Miles Medical Co.] as
establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its
distributor to set minimum resale prices.”). The actual history, however, is quite
complicated. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory
in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 389–91 (1989)
(expounding upon the complex history of courts interpreting the Dr. Miles holding).
214. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899.
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often RPM is anticompetitive.215 In dissent, four justices cited the
importance of ninety-six years of precedent as an important reason for
keeping the Dr. Miles standard.216 Stare decisis was not enough,
however, for the Court’s majority.217
Surely the changing state of knowledge or the Court’s views as to the
economics profession’s changing opinion over time concerning the
issue of how often, or what percentage of the time, a practice is
anticompetitive, should count for less than the fair reading of the
relevant statutory language. Surely the foremost task of the Supreme
Court should be to determine the fair meaning of the statutes the
legislative branch enacts.
V. THE EVOLVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Most economists at first glance probably think a no-fault monopolist
law would be inefficient. With a second glance the inefficiency is by no
means clear. The antitrust field has not seriously undertaken an overall
economic analysis of the no-fault approach to monopolization law in
half a century.218 Perhaps this is because the subject has not been taken
seriously on a political level during most of this period so that first
glances were deemed sufficient. We here take a second glance and find
the possibility that no-fault is efficient and in other ways desirable. This
is not only in the usual sense of lower prices and higher levels of quality
and variety of goods and services for consumers, but also in the
possibility of improvements according to other relevant criteria
affecting society’s welfare.
215. See id. at 889 (noting that most literature contains procompetitive justifications
for using RPM).
216. See id. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had never
“overturned so well-established a statutory precedent”).
217. See id. at 882.
218. Justice Brandeis was the earliest prominent U.S. legal scholar to condemn all
privately attained monopolies. See infra note 436. No-fault monopolization’s high
point came in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of mainstream scholars advocated
for it using their expansive interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Lao, supra
note 17, at 762 (stating that many antitrust intellectuals, such as Donald Turner,
Phillip Areeda, and Oliver Williamson, advocated for the no-fault theory in the late
1960s and 1970s). Their scholarship helped spur the first major no-fault policy
initiative, President Andrew Johnson’s Neal Task Force, and the first no-fault bill,
which Senator Philip Hart introduced in 1976. Id. at 769. See generally Lawrence J.
White, A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile Industry (I), 7 ANTITRUST L. ECON.
REV., no. 3, 1975, at 89 (providing an excellent no-fault oriented study of the U.S.
auto industry from this period).
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Recently, a significant number of prominent politicians have
demonstrated an interest in breaking up firms they perceive as being
“monopolies”—often without inquiring into whether they engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.219 It is perhaps unsurprising that breaking up
such possible monopolies220 like Amazon, Facebook, and Google—
without first finding that they engaged in anticompetitive conduct—
has been suggested by politicians on the left of the political spectrum,
including Senators Warren221 and Sanders.222 What has perhaps been
surprising, in light of conservatives’ traditional deference towards big
business, has been harsh criticism from the right, including from
President Trump,223 and even calls for their break-up or regulation

219. Our view is that if antitrust authorities adequately deal with exclusionary
practices break up may not be appropriate or necessary.
220. See Makena Kelly, Donald Trump on Tech Antitrust: ‘There’s Something Going On,’
VERGE (June 10, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/10/18659619/
donald-trump-facebook-google-amazon-apple-antitrust-european-union-eu (reporting
that, in reference to Google and Facebook, President Trump said, “I think it’s a bad
situation, but obviously there’s something going on in terms of monopoly”). We make
no judgment as to whether Google or Facebook is a monopoly. We merely note that
some prominent politicians believe that they are.
221. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s how we can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8,
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad
9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/3ZVW-Y9YF].
222. Senator Bernie Sanders, when asked whether he would break up Facebook,
Google, and Amazon if he were elected President, responded “absolutely,” adding that
he would appoint an attorney general “who would break up these huge corporations.”
Lima, supra note 16. Senator Sanders also introduced a bill that would break up the
largest financial institutions in the United States and establish a cap on size going
forward. Bernie Sanders, Sanders, Sherman Introduce Legislation to Break up Too Big to Fail
Financial Institutions (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/sanders-sherman-introduce-legislation-to-break-up-too-big-to-fail-financialinstitutions [https://perma.cc/Q23M-VWEF]. Senator Sanders said he would “use the
Sherman Antitrust Act to put CEOs of monopolistic companies in jail.” Hirsch, supra
note 16.
223. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889675644396867584 (arguing that
Amazon constitutes a “no-tax monopoly”). President Trump also said he was looking
at breaking up all three companies. Kim Hart & Sara Fischer, Trump’s Big Tech
Contradictions, AXIOS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-big-tech-googleamazon-facebook-957600ac-2d45-476c-a5ee-9bf534c85f80.html
[https://perma.cc/CNA8-5V2F]; see also Emily Stephenson, Trump Vows to Weaken U.S.
Media ‘Power Structure’ if Elected, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:25 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/usa-election/trump-vows-to-weaken-u-s-media-power-structure-ifelected-idUSL1N1CS08H (opposing the AT&T-Time Warner merger and advocating
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from a large number of other leading conservative figures, including
Steve Bannon224 and Senator Ted Cruz.225
This Article will not undertake a complete analysis of the economics
of no-fault monopolization. This Article’s much more modest goal is
to present an overview of many of the most important economic issues
involved. Even this brief overview will demonstrate, however, that this
is a topic that deserves careful analysis and debate by the antitrust
community. It will suggest only that sanctioning all monopolies is a
reasonable proposal that is worth considering seriously.
Our analysis begins with a brief historical overview of the evolution
of the profession’s scholarship concerning the no-fault issue, and then
briefly discusses one of its most important economic facts: the probable
effects of a no-fault policy on innovation.226 The Article then gives an
overview of its possible effects on international competitiveness, on
allocative inefficiency, and on the prevention of wealth transfers from
consumers to monopolies.227 The Article then briefly discusses its
possible effect on income equity and equality, and then on privacy.228
As a part of these discussions it will note the inefficiencies that can arise
as firms attain and protect their monopoly.229
This Article also will consider the downsides of this approach,
including the possibility that it could send a confusing or perverse
signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition.230 This approach

Comcast’s divestiture of NBC Universal because “[d]eals like this destroy democracy”
and “concentrat[e] [ ] power in the hands of too few”).
224. See Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/steve-bannon-googlefacebook/535473 (reporting that Steve Bannon, a right-wing ideologue and President
Trump’s former chief strategist, called for public utility regulation of tech platforms
like Facebook and Google).
225. Jessica Guynn, Ted Cruz Threatens to Regulate Facebook, Google and Twitter over
Charges of Anti-Conservative Bias, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/2019/04/10/ted-cruz-threatens-regulate-facebook-twitterover-alleged-bias/3423095002 [https://perma.cc/VHE7-6Z6C]; see also Robert H.
Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan, Preventing the Curse of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger
Legislation, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75, 91–99 (2020) (providing examples of current
conservative and liberal political leaders calling to break up firms that allegedly have
market power).
226. See infra Section V.A–B.
227. See infra Section V.B.
228. See infra Section V.B.
229. See infra Section V.B.
230. See infra Section V.C.

2020]

NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION

545

could be especially likely to discourage firms from competing hard
when a firm’s size nears the ambiguous market share levels required
for a violation. Moreover, at least 90% of antitrust cases are private
actions. A relevant question is: what are the effects of no-fault on such
actions? Would it increase or decrease the extent to which firms use
the Sherman Act for protectionist business purposes? In addition, the
transaction costs involved in sanctioning monopolies could be
significantly changed under no-fault. No-fault could also lead to special
problems for natural monopolies and patent monopolies, so it seems
virtually certain they would require conduct remedies rather than
structural relief.231
It must be emphasized that we will not attempt to fully analyze these
issues to determine the overall net effects of no-fault on economic
welfare. Its modest goal is to encourage the antitrust profession to restart the analysis and debate over sanctioning all monopolies. The
indeterminacy can support arguments for either “no-fault” actions or
for a “no-action-at-all” policy as it is easy to marshal economic
arguments on both sides. The balance of these arguments necessarily
depends upon an evaluation of how effective and efficient antitrust
policy is likely to be (including the number and magnitudes of false
positive and false negative errors) while also considering litigation and
other costs generated by the policy.232 We only suggest that the existing
literature contains enough support for a no-fault position so that the
doctrine is not a priori unreasonable.233
A. Economists’ Evolving Opinions
The Sherman Act initially had broad appeal.234 Later surveys suggest
that in general, economists continue to favor the Act. In a survey of a
231. This article will not, however, undertake an extensive analysis of monopolies
achieved through merger because, in light of the Clayton Act, this is a rarity. See
generally Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the
Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783 (analyzing monopolies
obtained through mergers).
232. These concerns are sometimes called Type I, Type II, and Type III errors. See
Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1670–71 (1983) (discussing the different type of errors that can
underlie merger policy decisions).
233. See infra Section V.F.
234. See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U.
CHI. L. REV. 221, 221–22 (1956) (“In the years immediately before the Sherman Act,
between 1888 and 1890, there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts
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random sample of economists, 75% agreed that the antitrust laws
should be used aggressively to reduce monopoly power.235 More than
a half-century ago there were, however, plenty of opinions on the
subject, but little evidence about the economic effects of monopolies.236
One of the earliest important attempts to determine the efficacy of
antitrust was by Nobel Laureate George Stigler.237 In 1952, Stigler was
a proponent of no-fault monopolization, although later he changed
his view.238 Although we will not attempt to trace the evolution of
economists’ analysis since Stigler, we note that quite recently, Thomas
Philippon argued that oligopoly is now pervasive in the U.S. and costs
the typical American household more than $5,000 per year.239 The
following is a brief survey of a number of possible economic effects of
a no-fault monopoly proposal.

fervently.”); see also Arthur Robert Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price
Competition, 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 301–02 (1937) (highlighting the
Sherman Act’s appeal at the time of its enactment); Sanford D. Gordon, Attitudes
Towards Trusts Prior to the Sherman Act, 30 S. ECON. J. 156, 157–58 (1963) (surveying a
broad array of academic and mainstream sources from the 1880s and concluding that
they were almost ubiquitously hostile to trusts).
235. Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical
Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV., 986, 988 (1984); see also J.R. Kearl et al., What Economists
Think: A Confusion of Economists?, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30 (1979) (providing statistical
data on the percentage of economists that believed government should use the
antitrust laws to vigorously reduce monopoly power).
236. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY:
A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966) (summarizing what could be called the nofault approach to the monopoly problem during the Great Depression). Hawley
thoroughly discusses the opinions of prominent government officials, academics, and
businesspeople on monopoly and the no-fault approach during the Great Depression.
Id. at 12. It shows the substantial sentiments against not just monopoly, but also against
corporate size itself. Id. These sentiments were associated with what Hawley called the
“Brandeisians,” intellectuals that felt that small business promoted equity and an
ambience of community. See generally id. at 281–89 (discussing the scholars that
adhered to Brandeis’s philosophy).
237. George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225,
225 (1966) (quantifying the effects of antitrust laws).
238. See Lao, supra note 17, at 766–67.
239. David Leonhardt, Opinion, Big Business Is Overcharging You $5,000 a Year, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 10 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/opinion/big-businessconsumer-prices.html.
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B. Overview of Economic Effects Mostly Supporting No-Fault
1. Likely effects on innovation
A trenchant argument in favor of no-fault antitrust actions lies in the
evidence that monopoly on average retards innovation.240 By
innovation, we mean both technological invention and better ways of
doing things. Carl Shapiro’s review of the literature finds that “[t]he
unifying principle . . . is that innovation, broadly defined, is spurred if
the market is contestable; that is, if multiple firms are vying to win
profitable future sales.”241 In other words, competition is usually good
for innovation.
As Whinston notes in his review of Carl Shapiro’s work, the forces
determining innovation are complex, but market structure is itself
important.242 The major thrust of the literature is that the rate of
innovation tends to be greatest when a market is competitive.243 This
result is consistent with the work of Pakes and McGuire244 and is
illustrated in the following diagram, which shows low levels of
innovation with very competitive markets, high research and
development (“R&D”) rates for contestable markets, and a leveling off
of innovation for markets with little competition, with monopolies
innovating the least.

240. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 74 (1942)
(arguing that large firm market share enhances innovation but only up to a point).
Schumpeter noted, for example: “[What] counts . . . [is] competition from the new
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of
organization . . . competition [that] . . . strikes not at the margins of the profits and
the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.” Id.
241. Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 401 (Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2012).
242. Michael D. Whinston, Comment, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY REVISITED (citing Shapiro, supra note 241, at 404–05).
243. Shapiro, supra note 241, at 362.
244. Ariel Pakes & Paul McGuire, Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical
Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model, 25 RAND J. ECON. 555, 573, 575,
577 (1994).
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Recent empirical scholarship has also shown that more competitive
markets result in more innovation245 and that “market power tends to
slow innovation and productivity improvements in the affected
markets.”246 Carstensen and Lande note that “[i]t is extremely difficult
to determine [a theory that offers an] a priori” “prediction about the
effects of competition on innovation that is robust to all of these

245. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 8–9.
246. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH. CTR. FOR
EQUITABLE GROWTH 9 (Mar. 2017), http://equitablegrowth.org/researchanalysis/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today [https://perma.cc/2BX4-S5VV]; see
also id. (summarizing literature on market power and innovation). Professor Baker
explains this new learning:
The modern Schumpeterian growth literature concludes that greater productmarket competition fosters R&D investment by all firms in sectors where the
firms operate at the same technological level, and suggests that in the event
that product markets were to grow more competitive, the innovation
incentives of a dominant firm with a technological lead would remain high.
Id. at 15 n.57. He also notes:
At one time, empirical economists who studied the question thought that some
market power but not extensive market power would be best for innovation,
based on cross-industry studies that found an “inverted-U” relationship between
market concentration. But those studies did not successfully control for
differences in technological opportunity across industries.
Id. at 15 n.58 (citing Wesley M. Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity
and Performance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 129, 146–48, 154–
55 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010)); Shapiro, supra note 241, at
380; see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 34 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing increases in innovation during periods
when there is an increase in the number of mergers).
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different market and technological conditions”247 or predict “which
innovation will be successful and which will prove a failure.”248 Thus, it is
vital to continue to explore and develop many innovative options at the
same time.
Recent literature shows some enforcement authorities, concerned with
dynamic competition, have implicitly recognized the need to maintain a
larger group of competitors in “innovation markets” because “innovation
suffers when . . . companies merge.”249 Similarly, Professor John Kwoka, in
his review of the merger literature, concludes that:
Overall, the careful economic studies in the literature as well as
other relevant evidence do not support the proposition that industry
consolidation results in more R&D or greater R&D efficiency. In
fact, there is evidence in the best of these studies that suggests that
these mergers may adversely affect R&D.250

Nearly all studies found that increases in competition led to
increases in industry productivity.251 With greater competition, there is
greater fear of innovation by competitors, so investment in innovation
is more likely. These cases illustrate another reason why monopoly is
bad for investment and innovation: if a firm has no competitors, then
its input suppliers have a greater incentive to invest in their own market

247. Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the CompetitionInnovation Debate, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 162 (Adam B. Jaffe,
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds. 2006).
248. Carstensen & Lande, supra note 231, at 813. Some argue that the difficulty of
making predictions about innovation in individual cases means that these dynamic
issues should not be the basis for merger enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Richard T.
Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 Antitrust
L.J. 19, 20, 24, 26 (1995).
249. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers when Drug
Companies Merge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/researchinnovation-suffers-when-drug-companies-merge (looking at innovation among drug
companies).
250. See John Kwoka, The Effects of Mergers on Innovation: Economic Framework and
Empirical Evidence 29–30 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
251. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Growth in the Long Run: A Model of Discovery, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 341 (2009)
(noting that higher quantities of goods are sold under competition); Jan De Loecker
& Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Firm Performance in a Global Market, 6 ANN. REV. ECON.
201, 202 (2014) (stating that economists have long postulated that competition makes
firms more efficient).
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power and thereby extract surplus from the monopoly.252 This indeed
appears to be a potent source of monopolistic waste.253
2. Effects on international competitiveness
Professor Michael Porter finds that the prevalence of domestic rivals
tends to lead to an international advantage stimulates improvement
and innovation.254 He further notes that firms that do not innovate will
not succeed.255
Porter finds that a key role of the government in advancing the
economy is promoting “vigorous domestic rivalry” since the lack of
domestic competition tends to hinder international competitiveness.256
Porter, analyzing a number of countries over time, further notes that
firms that do not have to compete at home rarely succeed abroad, and that
economies of scale, “the most potent determinants of competitiveness,” are
best achieved through global sales rather than domestic dominance.257
According to Porter, the practicalities of politics create bad policy in a
market of one or two firms as policymakers tend to accord such firms
special treatment that reduces the incentive to compete.258
Porter’s work is not alone in finding that domestic competition is
central to economic growth.259 In Latin America, where economic
growth has been slow, markets are often characterized by highly
concentrated industrial sectors, lack of a strong competition policy,
large informal economies, and historically close links between business

252. See, e.g., James A. Schmitz Jr., What Determines Productivity? Lessons from the
Dramatic Recovery of the U.S. and Canadian Iron Ore Industries Following Their Early 1980s
Crisis, 113 J. POL. ECON. 582, 591 & n.16 (2005); see also Thomas J. Holmes & James A.
Schmitz, Jr., Competition at Work: Railroads vs. Monopoly in the U.S. Shipping Industry, 25
FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 3, 3–4 (2001) (discussing competition in the longdistance transportation industry); Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Jr.,
Competition and Productivity: A Review of Evidence, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 619, 620–21 (2010)
(reviewing literature that examines the link between competition and productivity).
253. Schmitz Jr., supra note 252, at 26–27.
254. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. BUS. REV. (1990),
https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-competitive-advantage-of-nations.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. This echoes Schumpeter’s statements about the effect of monopoly on
political structure. Schumpeter, supra note 240, at 47.
259. Id.; see, e.g., Federico J. Díez et al., Global Market Power and Its Macroeconomic
Implications 1 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 18/137, 2018).
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and the political community.260 Stronger competition policy can be
part of changes in competition that might help promote economic
growth and competition.261
Spurred by increasing globalization, there is increasing interest in
international cooperation with respect to antitrust.262 Globally,
antitrust law is characterized by a striking mixture of promoting
competitiveness on the one hand and protection of favored industries
and cartel exemptions on the other.263 There are clear attempts of
nations to slant antitrust in ways that favor the home country at the
expense of others.264 As each country does this, it would seem to result
in harm to each country’s trade and to lower welfare.265 A global nofault approach could help address this collective action problem.
3. Effects on allocative inefficiency & wealth transfers
In 1954, Economist Arnold Harberger estimated that the costs of
monopoly that resulted from misallocation of resources across industries
were trivial.266 Harberger’s focus was on the deadweight loss (“DWL”)
from monopoly pricing.267 This research led to the near consensus in the
260. See R. Shyam Khemani & Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment Climate,
Competition Policy, and Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67,
68–70, 74, 78 (2008).
261. See OECD, FACTSHEET ON HOW COMPETITION POLICY AFFECTS MACRO-ECONOMIC
OUTCOMES 3 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-competitionfactsheet-iv-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR88-9QZQ] (“[P]olicies that lead to markets
operating more competitively . . . will result in faster economic growth.”).
262. See, e.g., INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., ICPAC FINAL REPORT 33–
34 (2000) (finding that the increased interest in cooperation between U.S. antitrust
authorities and their counterparts across the globe is due to an “increase in the
number of international cartel cases prosecuted by the Antitrust Division,” barriers to
market access from anticompetitive private barriers to trade, and an increased number
of mergers).
263. See Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L.
355, 356 (2004) (noting that American law provides an explicit exception for export
cartels).
264. Id. (providing examples of how countries “slant” their antitrust laws to favor
local companies).
265. See id. at 357–58 (explaining how a country’s antitrust policymaking decisions
affect the country’s consumers).
266. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV.
77, 87 (1954) (“[M]onopoly does not seem to affect aggregate welfare very seriously
through its effect on resource allocation.”).
267. Id. at 78 fig.1. See generally RICHARD O. ZERBE & DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994) (defining deadweight loss from monopoly
pricing).
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economics profession that monopoly’s effects on efficiency are of little
significance.268 Economists Scherer and Ross evaluated several empirical
estimates of the relative sizes of the DWL to get somewhat higher values
(0.5% to 2.0% of GNP).269
In sharp contrast to Harberger’s finding, more recent studies show
that the allocative inefficiency (deadweight welfare losses) costs
associated with monopoly are large, even quite large.270 Further, since
firms can spend resources to convince the government to implement
policies that will create or preserve monopoly, there can be competition
for these monopoly profits.271 These costs can be pure waste, or income
or wealth transfers272 without accompanying productive gains: rentseeking.273 Professor Gordon Tullock introduced the rent-seeking idea
in 1967 and Anne Kreuger expanded and labeled it in 1974.274 In 1975,
268. See, e.g., David Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON. 627, 630
(1960) (agreeing with Harberger’s conclusion that the welfare loss from monopoly is
small). Other authors have also attempted to measure the costs of monopoly power.
See, e.g., Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON.
J. 727, 727 (1978) (stating that the “conventional wisdom” is that ““welfare losses from
monopoly are insignificant”); Joaquín Maudos & Juan Fernández de Guevara, The Cost
of Market Power in Banking: Social Welfare Loss vs. Cost Inefficiency, 31 J. BANKING & FIN.
2103, 2106 (2007) (finding that for fifteen EU countries between 1993 and 2002, “the
welfare gains associated with a fall in market power may be far larger than the loss of
bank cost efficiency . . . . show[ing] the importance of the economic policy measures
aimed at removing the barriers . . . [to] outside competition.”). But see S.C. Littlechild,
Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 91 ECON. J. 348 (1981)
(criticizing Herberger’s and Cowler and Mueller’s studies, among others). See generally
Jan De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135
Q.J. ECON. 561 (2020).
269. Compare Harberger, supra note 266, at 86 (“[W]e have labored . . . to get a big
estimate of the welfare loss, and we have come out in the end with less than a tenth of
a per cent of the national income.”), with F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 675–76 (3d ed. 1990).
270. See, e.g., James A. Schmitz, Jr., FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, NEW AND
LARGER COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND TARIFFS 5 (2012) (“[T]he historical studies . . . call
the Harberger consensus into question. At least in the industries studied thus far,
monopoly and tariffs have led to significant welfare losses.”).
271. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 292 (1974) (“[C]ompetition can also occur through allocating
resources to influencing the probability, or expected size, of license allocations.”).
272. See, e.g., Ronald L. Goettler & Brett R. Gordon, Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate
More?, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1188 (2011) (finding that while Intel would have
innovated more as a monopoly, most consumers were better off with slightly less
innovation and the stronger price competition of AMD).
273. See Krueger, supra note 271, at 293.
274. See generally id.
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Richard Posner argued that competition to engage in rent-seeking could
raise costs until all monopoly profits were transformed into costs.275
Further development has both attempted to quantify these costs and
shown that rent-seeking occurs both within a monopoly firm and
outside it.276 These estimates come from examining histories of
industries in which a monopoly is destroyed or created.277 Rent-seeking
behavior by different divisions within the firm and between the firm
and its unions is quite costly, resulting in: (1) lower productivity at each
factory and (2) misallocation of resources between high and low
productivity plants.278
As economist James Schmitz notes, “[w]hen a monopoly is created,
‘rents’ are created.”279 Schmitz states that “[c]onﬂict emerges among
shareholders, managers, and employees of the monopoly as they
negotiate how to divide these rents.”280 Stakeholders establish new
mechanisms to split these rents in order to reduce competition among
members of the monopoly.281 But mechanisms can destroy rents as
well—they can reduce productivity and result in misallocation.282 The
costs due to low productivity alone are large.283 In fact, factory
productivity raised significantly when monopolies were broken up in
each industry.284 Schmitz noted that it was common for factory
productivity to double within a few years.285 Schmitz calculated that as
much as 20% to 30% of industry value to be wasted inputs.286

275. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 807, 824 (1975).
276. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 270, at 1 (“In standard economic theory,
monopoly leads to a welfare loss . . . . stem[ming] from a misallocation of resources
across industries . . . . Recently, a new literature has taken a different approach . . . .
[l]ooking within industries . . . .”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1–2.
279. Id. at 2; see also id. at 2 n.1 (defining rent as “the difference between what a factor
of production is actually paid and what it would need to be paid to remain in use”).
280. Id. at 2.
281. See id. at 16 (“Rules to reduce competition (such as quotas and work rules)
were an indirect means to split rents between groups.”).
282. Id. at 2.
283. See id. (“In sharp contrast to Harberger’s finding, these studies show that
welfare costs associated with monopoly and tariffs are not small.”).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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4. Effects on income equity & equality287
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Professor Thomas Piketty notes
that between 1980 and the present, there has been an unprecedented
increase in income inequality in the United States and Europe, and
that it is likely to become much more unequal unless new remedies are
applied.288
Research associates higher levels of inequality with social instability
and lower growth rates.289 Piketty sees inequality challenging
democracy and leading to oligarchy, if left unabated.290 He predicts
dire consequences in the absence of remedies.291 Similarly, Professors
Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop show how inequality can undermine the
legitimacy of our social order, given the wealthiest have a disproportionate
influence on public policy and reduce economic growth.292

287. We also note a cultural argument for breaking up large firms—an argument
that stems from existence values. Existence values occur when there is a willingness to
pay for existence of a good, apart from its market value, which can arise when the
market does not exist. See Note, Existence-Value Standing, 129 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–76
(2016). Consider that large firms drive out small firms when in fact people would
rather have smaller firms, but because of collective action costs, larger firms
win. Suppose for example, that people favor small local stores as part of their
culture. They tend, however, to buy from large price cutters as their prices are
lower. The result is the loss of local stores which they did not want and if acting
collectively would pay to avoid. Each person, however, buying from the large stores
fails to account for the effects of their action on the structure of businesses as a whole.
Krutilla published the original article on existence values. See John V.
Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–80 (1967).
288. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (2014) (“Since 1980, however, income
inequality has exploded in the United States . . . . The shape of the curve is rather
impressively steep[;] . . . if change continues at the same pace, for example, the upper
decile will be raking in [sixty] percent of national income by 2030.”); see also RICHARD
O. ZERBE, THE PATH OF HUMAN PROGRESS 141 (2017) (estimating that while in 2015 the
top 1% had about seven times the per capita wealth of the bottom 50%, by 2065 this
will grow to a factor of 185 if the present trend continues).
289. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 23 (2010) (noting that health and social
problems are strongly correlated to income inequality).
290. See PIKETTY, supra note 288, at 463 (“[A] threat [that] . . . seems [ ]credible and
dangerous [is] an oligarchic type of divergence, that is, a process in where the rich
countries would come to be owned by their own billionaires.”).
291. See id. at 571.
292. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 8 (2015).
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Part of the cause for rising inequality lies in competition policy. An
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)
paper covering eight OECD countries—Canada, France, Germany,
Korea, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
finds that for the average country in the sample, market power
increased the wealth of the richest 10% and by between 12% and 21%
for a range of reasonable assumptions about savings behavior, while it
reduces the income of the poorest 20% by 11% or more.293 The paper
suggests that lack of competition is an important source of economic
inequality.294 Greater equality may then be a byproduct of a strong
competition policy.295
5. Effects on consumer and user privacy
Monopolies are less likely to protect the privacy of consumers, users,
and affected friends and associates. A recent article by Professors
Gregory Day and Abbey Stemler provides several reasons why
monopolies are likely to protect privacy suboptimally296: (1) it will be
difficult for users, consumers, or third parties to punish monopolies
that violate their privacy by switching to other firms; (2) because of the
nature of privacy, it will be more difficult for people even to ascertain
whether a breach occurred, from where it occurred, or the true costs
of preserving their privacy; and (3) other firms will be less likely to
compete on the basis of privacy with incumbent monopolists that
appear to offer “free” goods or services,297 such as the use of Google,

293. Sean Ennis et al., Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power, OECD 1, 21 (2017),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Inequality-hidden-cost-market-power2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F6N-4NPR].
294. See id. at 23 (“Policies that enhance competition—by reducing anti-competitive
regulation or trade barriers, empowering consumer choice, fighting illegal cartels,
empowering consumers through market studies, preventing mergers that create
market power, or the abuse of market power—can therefore help reduce inequality.”);
see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 140–41 (3d ed.
1950) (stating that a nation is “profoundly affected by the elimination of a host of small
and medium sized firms” and that monopolies can give rise to substantial political and
welfare effects).
295. See Ennis et al., supra note 293, at 23.
296. See Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Infracompetitive Privacy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 61,
92 (2019) (presenting the implications of recent technology for privacy and how this,
in turn, can affect competition and become an antitrust concern).
297. Products like Google and Facebook are not really free if the user is providing
valuable data on themselves and on the users’ friends and business associates. Id. at
63–64.
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Facebook, etc. It is especially difficult to enter a market for apparently
free products, so monopolies of these products are likely to persist.
The amount of privacy protection a monopoly is likely to provide for
consumers and users will often be suboptimal because the technology
that collects valuable data can impose more costs on society—in the
form of necessary privacy protections and the costs of security breaches
and unconsented-to sales of data—than efficiencies.298 These costs are
often relatively hidden, so consumers, users and affected third parties
often will have a hard time valuing them, and the market often will
have a difficult time curing any problems optimally.299 Antitrust, with
its traditional focus on consumer prices, will not be as cognizant of the
true costs of privacy breaches and misuse as it should be.300
A deeper privacy problem is that firms with a large online presence,
such as Google, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft, gain from collecting
customer or user data mainly in order to discover and create preferences.301
Moreover, collecting consumer data is most useful for larger firms than for
their smaller counterparts. However, often in doing so, these larger firms
potentially implicate consumer privacy.302
C. Overview of Economic Arguments That Mostly Weigh Against No-Fault
1. Incentives to compete less vigorously
The effects of incentives on business behavior are complex and
sometimes counter-intuitive, so prediction in the case of no-fault is
difficult.303 One would think, however, that the possibility of an antitrust

298. See id. at 64 (“The issue is that platforms enjoy data’s economic potential
without bearing the full costs of protecting privacy.”).
299. See id. at 93 (“[C]oncentrated markets have enabled tech firms to ignore
privacy concerns as few rivals exist to shed light on the problems borne from their
treatment of personal information.”).
300. See id. at 66–67 (discussing the growing momentum to expand the scope of the
Sherman Act to promote more than competitive prices).
301. See id. at 68–72 (describing how companies with an online presence use
personal data to create individualized experiences).
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., Soledad Artiz Prillaman & Kenneth J. Meier, Taxes, Incentives, and
Economic Growth: Assessing the Impact of Pro-Business Taxes on U.S. State Economies, 76 J.
POL. 364, 376–77 (2014) (finding that state tax decreases have little effect on business
location or behavior); see also Susanna Gallani, Incentives, Peer Pressure, and Behavior
Persistence 22–23 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-070, 2017) (finding that
explicit monetary incentives for workers are less successful in achieving persistent
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action against a firm achieving monopoly without engaging in
anticompetitive behavior would have some deterrent effect on
monopoly formation.304 This deterrent effect could send a confusing
or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition,
especially when a firm’s market share nears the minimum required for
a Section 2 violation.305 Economist George Bittlingmayer, for example,
believes that “whatever the ability of antitrust to lower prices and
increase output in theory or in isolated circumstances, one actual
effect of antitrust in practice may have been to curtail investment.”306
However, when a monopolist is shielded from hard competition, it
may be able to relax and enjoy a quiet life.307 Professor Jonathan Baker,
performance improvement when compared to implicit incentives, such as horizontal
monitoring and peer pressure).
304. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins.”); see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices . . . is an important element of the freemarket system.”).
305. See infra Part VI and notes 358, 425 (discussing the minimum market share
levels usually required for a Section 2 violation).
306. George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from
Antitrust Enforcement 20 CATO J. 295, 322 (2001).
307. See J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“[Monopolists] are likely to exploit their advantage much
more by not bothering to get very near the position of maximum profit, than by
straining themselves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet
life.”). Economists have written about the inefficiencies that result when a monopolist
is shielded from hard competition. See, e.g., Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs.
“X-Efficiency,” 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 408–09 (1966) (arguing that the motivations and
incentives of workers and managers are different when their firm does not have to face
competition). Professor Leibenstein explains:
In situations where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the
disutility of greater effort, of search, and the control of other peoples’ activities
for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. But
in situations where competitive pressures are high, and hence the costs of such
trades are also high, they will exchange less of the disutility of effort for the
utility of freedom from pressure, etc.
Id. at 413.
Similarly, some economists believe that it is “eminently plausible” that inefficiencies
resulting from weak competitive pressures “are at least as large as the welfare losses
from [allocative inefficiency].” See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 269, at 672. This is
because monopolies can create organizational slack by tolerating inefficiency and
waste. Id. at 667. Without competition, monopolies have less incentive to cut waste or
to search for ways to reduce costs. Monopolies may, instead, have the discretion to
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for example, believes there is a positive and large welfare effect from
the antitrust deterrence of anticompetitive activity.308 Baker examines
the implications of socially beneficial federal antitrust challenges
against collusive behaviors like price fixing, mergers likely to adversely
affect competition, and monopolists who use anticompetitive
exclusionary practices to obtain and maintain their market power.309
He then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust
derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S.
firms during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the
behavior of firms across different national antitrust regimes.310 Overall,
he finds benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social
welfare appear to be far larger than what the government spends on
antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on
antitrust compliance.311
Of course, reduced incentives to compete vigorously are far from no
incentives. Even if a monopolist or would-be monopolist’s incentives
to compete are reduced, no-fault could also increase incentives for
rivals and potential rivals to compete harder as the monopolist is
somewhat constrained by no-fault. Similarly, it could serve to reduce
the presence of monopoly less expensively than conventional antitrust
actions.312 This would be similar to a firm refraining from establishing
a monopoly in the expectation that the rents would all go to elsewhere,
e.g., to a union.
2. Incentives to engage in sham litigation
Sham litigation is non-legitimate litigation whose purpose is to raise
rivals’ costs relative to those of the firm filing the lawsuit.313 It is a type
make a comfortable profit while tolerating a substantial amount of “fat” in their
organizations and further wasting of society’s resources. Id.
308. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
2003, at 27, 27 (“Overall, the benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social
welfare . . . seem likely to be far larger than what the government spends on antitrust
enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.”).
309. Id. at 28–35.
310. See id. at 36–40 (“In sum, studies of firm behavior during these four periods
demonstrate that without antitrust, firms can and do exercise market power, to the
detriment of consumers and other buyers.”).
311. Id. at 27.
312. See infra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing transaction costs of
antitrust suits).
313. See, e.g., William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 247–48 (1985) (discussing how firms bring private
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of non-price predatory behavior.314 A study by economist Christopher
Klein suggested economic criteria for determining whether such
litigation is sham or legitimate.315 He examined 117 Sherman Act
countersuits alleging sham litigation.316 He found that while fewer
countersuits were litigated than had been expected according to his
criteria, more of the countersuits were allowed to pass summary
judgment than his criteria predicted.317 The implication for no-fault is
that developing and applying economic criteria in rejecting no-fault
cases may not result in significant untoward legal costs associated with
sham litigation.
3. Increased transaction costs
Another argument against no-fault is the transaction costs that would
necessarily be involved in the resulting cases. The cases’ relief could
entail significant transaction costs, regardless whether it is structural or

sham litigation but also attempt to induce the government to pursue enforcement
action against their competitors); see also R. Preston McAfee et al., Private Antitrust
Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, 282 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS 453,
453–55 (“Firms may have incentive to use the antitrust laws strategically, which may
hinder rather than promote competition.”). Despite the clear costs of sham litigation,
legislative safeguards against it present challenges. See 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 248 (4th ed. Supp. 2015) (noting that protections against sham litigation
run the risk of chilling access to one’s First Amendment right to free speech).
314. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 267, 267 (1983) (“To a predator, raising rivals’ costs has obvious advantages over
predatory pricing . . . . In contrast to pricing conduct, where the large predator loses
money in the short run faster than its smaller ‘victim,’ it may be relatively inexpensive
for a dominant firm to raise rivals’ costs substantially.”).
315. See CHRISTOPHER C. KLEIN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM
LITIGATION: THEORY, CASES, AND POLICY 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM
LITIGATION] (“A definition of sham litigation that is more in keeping with economic
reasoning would identify sham litigation as predatory or fraudulent litigation with
anticompetitive effect . . . against rivals to achieve anticompetitive ends.”); see also
Christopher C. Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of the
Case Law, 6 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 241, 243 (1986) (“An economic approach to sham
litigation must treat this strategy as it would any scheme to deter entry or to reduce
competition.”).
316. See THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM LITIGATION, supra note 315, at 48.
317. See id. at 69–70 (explaining that finding fewer countersuits as legitimate was
more likely attributable to the study’s predation criteria as opposed to inconsistency
between the case law and economic reasoning).
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conduct-oriented.318 Moreover, virtually every antitrust case is
expensive for both sides.319 No-fault would surely increase the number
of Section 2 cases filed. Yet, each case would be simpler, because there
would be no need to litigate whether the case involved anticompetitive
conduct. Moreover, a major component of how many cases are
brought, settled, or move to trial is the clarity of the law.320 Thus, a major
determinant of the transaction costs involved would be the care with
which a violation of the Sherman Act under no-fault would be crafted.
The brighter the line, the fewer the cases that would be brought or go
to trial.
D. Special Issues Involving Natural Monopolies and Patents
Non-structural relief is the traditional kind of relief ordered in
monopolization cases, even in cases not involving natural monopolies
or patents.321 This is because the Supreme Court observed that structural
remedies are “more drastic” than injunctive relief.322 For example, in
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,323 the D.C. Circuit said that “structural
relief, which is ‘designed to eliminate the monopoly altogether . . .

318. See Diana L. Moss, Breaking up Is Hard to Do: The Implications of Restructuring and
Regulating Digital Technology Markets, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/2018
-2019/atsource-october2019/oct19_mossc.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ3G-EDY8] (considering
possible transaction costs that would stem from breaking up tech companies). But see Rory Van
Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 1) (arguing that structural remedies are not “unadministrable”).
319. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1276–78 (2013)
(discussing the high costs of antitrust litigation).
320. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 232, at 1654–55 (“Uncertainty entails several
costs: it can increase firms’ costs of finding desirable mergers and may even deter firms
from attempting some potentially desirable mergers.”).
321. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961).
322. Id. (describing divestiture as a “most drastic” remedy); see 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
§ 990c (3d ed. 2009) (stating that an injunction “prior to consummation of [a] merger
transaction is the least disruptive” remedy for all involved parties); see also 2A PHILLIP
E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION § 325 (4th ed. 2014) (“Because [the equity suit under antitrust law]
controls future behavior rather than punishing past acts . . . . [i]ts main purpose is to
restore competitive conditions rather than to penalize conduct or compensate injured
parties.”).
323. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’d, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
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require[s] a clearer indication of a significant causal connection between
the conduct and creation or maintenance of the market power.’”324 In
other words, the standards for a court ordering a structural remedy are
higher than they are for conduct-oriented remedies.325
Indeed, in the monopolization case against it, Microsoft asserted,
“[l]eaving aside negotiated consent decrees, no court has ever split
apart a unitary company not formed by mergers.”326 “The fact that no
court has ever ordered the breakup of a unitary company like Microsoft
demonstrates the extreme nature of the district court’s decree.”327 Even
if Microsoft’s absolutist assertion is, as Professor Kovacic demonstrates,
a significant exaggeration,328 there is no doubt that divestiture is an
unusual remedy in a monopolization case.
324. See id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION § 653b (1996)); see also United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 903 (D.
Md. 1916) (“I am frankly reluctant to destroy so finely adjusted an industrial machine
as the record shows the defendant to be.”).
325. Franklin Fisher, Professor Emeritus, MIT, Remarks at the Section 2 of the
Sherman Act Hearings of the Federal Trade Commission 110 (Mar. 28, 2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-2sherman-act-single-firm-conduct-related-competition/070328.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PK9V-VXSY] (“[C]ourts are traditionally reluctant to grant
structural relief . . . . [C]rafting [a structural remedy] is not easy and may sometimes
be impossible.”).
326. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 128, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212).
327. See id.
328. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (1989)
(classifying deconcentration suits by significance of resultant divestiture and finding
thirty-four cases in which the government “secured substantial divestiture”). For
example, Professor William E. Kovacic derived statistics for the success of relief efforts
in government monopolization cases:
When classified by outcomes, these deconcentration suits fall into three
categories. The first category consists of thirty-four cases in which the
government secured substantial divestiture. This set contains such landmark
decisions as Standard Oil Co. v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco
Co. A second category of prosecutions consists of cases such as United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, in which the government prevailed on liability but
failed to gain significant divestiture. The final category includes cases such as
United States v. United States Steel Corp. (U.S. Steel) in which the government
failed to establish the defendant’s liability under the Sherman Act. This
Section identifies and analyzes the historical patterns in which these
deconcentration measures have emerged.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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This would surely mean that if Section 2 of the Sherman Act is
interpreted to be a no-fault statute, monopolies convicted under this
approach would rarely, if ever, be broken up. No-fault cases surely
should not qualify as the highly exceptional cases in which a monopoly
should be broken up. Rather, we would expect remedies in no-fault
cases to be similar to those under consideration in Europe, which is
considering conduct proposals forbidding technology firms, such as
Google, to benefit in certain circumstances from using information
they collect as part of their normal business.329 There are in fact a
number of suggested remedies short of breakup, such as data sharing,
open platforms, and other solutions.330
1. Natural monopoly
Natural monopolies are those for which economies of scale or scope
exceed sustainable market size.331 A major modern concern relating to

329. See JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
DIGITAL ERA 92–93 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/
kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB49-2Y5Z] (advocating for the procompetitive outcomes resulting from data holders granting access to their
competitors).
330. See Moss, supra note 318, at 10 (“[O]ther policy tools should be added to the
mix to achieve well-defined goals for addressing identified problems in the digital
technology sector. Those policies can be framed to complement antitrust.”); Van Loo,
supra note 318, at 39 (“Access remedies have the potential to improve consumer
welfare, particularly in the context of financial and technology platforms or when a
breakup would destroy what consumers value most in a company.”).
331. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548,
548 (1969) (“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest
cost by one firm . . . the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of
firms in it.”). The costs of natural monopolies are those whose costs decline with
volume so that competition tends to be unviable. Id. at 587 (“Suppose that, due to
economies of scale, a particular market will accommodate only three firms . . . . If one
of those firms drives out the others, it may be able to raise its price [ ] without attracting
entry by a new firm, because of the difficulty involved in large-scale entry.”). Although
network effects can be due to economies of scale, they similarly arise when there are
economies in the production of a variety of related products, called “economies of
scope.” See Joel D. Goldhar & Mariann Jelinek, Plan for Economies of Scope, HARV. BUS. REV.
(1983), https://hbr.org/1983/11/plan-for-economies-of-scope (“[N]ew technical
capabilities rest on economies of scope—that is, efficiencies wrought by variety, not
volume.”). In this sense, the no-fault rule can legitimately apply to the case of a natural
monopoly short of breakup, suggesting restraints on the use of monopoly positions.
See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 169 (1982) (pioneering a definition of natural monopoly based
on the concept of subadditivity). A cost function is “subadditive” when any given total
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natural monopoly is network externalities, which include both scale
and scope economies.332 A classic example of a natural monopoly is the
type of networks that exist in the telecommunications field.333 The more
people sign up, the cheaper it is for the provider per unit of service.334
What would happen if no-fault were applied to natural monopolies?
We address this only to note that there are several possible remedies
short of break up for monopolies, both in general and especially for
monopolies involving natural monopolies or patents. Natural
monopolies strengthen their power by their ability to collect and use
information, and can themselves reasonably be tempered by requiring
them to share data acquired from customers.335 Moreover, if plaintiffs
were so unwise as to seek the break-up of a natural monopoly under a
no-fault theory, it seems likely that the reaction of the court would be
to dismiss the case entirely.336

output can be produced more cheaply by a single firm than by two or more firms. An
industry in which the cost function is subadditive is therefore regarded as a natural
monopoly. See id.
332. See, e.g., Allison Schrager, A Nobel-Winning Economist’s Guide to Taming Tech
Monopolies, QUARTZ (June 27, 2018), https://qz.com/1310266/nobel-winningeconomist-jean-tirole-on-how-to-regulate-tech-monopolies [https://perma.cc/7224UF56] (“[A]t the platform level [of tech companies], competition confronts the
existence of large returns to scale and/or network externalities, leading to natural
monopoly situations and a winner-take-all scenario.”).
333. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, America’s Monopoly Problem, Explained by Your Internet Bill,
VOX (Feb. 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2020/2/18/21126347/
antitrust-monopolies-internet-telecommunications-cheerleading
(“[T]elecommunications companies . . . are a sort of natural monopoly, meaning . . .
costs and other barriers to entry give early entrants a significant advantage. It costs
money to install a cable system . . . and once one company does that, there’s not a ton
of incentive to do it all over again.”).
334. See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law’s Natural Monopoly Cases,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 684 n.52 (1986) (“The rise in the exchange cost per subscriber as
their number increases is the counterpart of an improvement in the quality of service
rendered: each telephone is thereby enabled to reach more and more customers . . . .
at zero additional costs.”).
335. See, e.g., Natalia Drozdiak, EU Asks: Does Control of ‘Big Data’ Kill Competition?,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2018, 9:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-competitionchief-tracks-how-companies-use-big-data-1514889000 (“In cases where data is found to
be unique or essential, European regulators have considered requiring dominant
companies to share information with rivals—an approach that U.S. regulators have
rejected.”).
336. See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition
Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 167, 176 (Mads Andenas, Michael Hutchings &
Philip Marsden eds., 2004) (“My intuition is that courts . . . were ill at ease with the
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2. Patents
A no-fault Sherman Act implies that a monopoly legally gained
through patents could face prosecution upon expiration of the crucial
patent. However, this would mean that the firm had already enjoyed
twenty years in which to earn monopoly returns. The monopolist
could, moreover, avoid private damages suits by lowering its price to
some negotiated level or a level its potential prosecutors or judges are
likely to deem competitive. Thus, there would be significant incentives
for firms having patent monopoly status to quickly lower their prices.
Moreover, Economists Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine find little
evidence that patents spur innovation.337 If they are correct, and we are
by no means certain that they are, the current patent system may be
misguided.338 If they are correct, no-fault would not cause any patentrelated harms.
E. Micro-Studies of Two Huge Monopolization Cases: AT&T and IBM
One approach to predicting the probable effects of no-fault
monopoly would be to systematically study the results of a large
number of cases where a defendant had been subjected to a remedy in
a Section 2 case. Although this would not address, let alone answer, all
the economic questions involved, it would further the analysis
considerably. We present two microanalyses of Section 2 remedies only
to suggest what type of analysis a court could perform on a much more
detailed level and for a much larger number of cases.
The Justice Department filed possibly the two largest Section 2 cases
in history against IBM and AT&T.339 In 1982, the Justice Department

possibility that a finding of illegal monopolization would trigger the imposition of
massive damage[s] . . . . The courts in these matters could not refuse to treble
damages . . . , but they could interpret the law in ways that resulted in . . . no liability.”).
337. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2013, at 3, 20 (concluding patents “block innovation and inhibit competition”).
338. Id. (“In general, public policy should aim to decrease patent monopolies
gradually but surely, and the ultimate goal should be the abolition of patents.”).
339. See James B. Stewart, Whales and Sharks, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 1993, at 38
(stating that the I.B.M. and AT&T cases were “the largest antitrust cases in living
memory.”).
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announced that they were abandoning the IBM case and that AT&T
had capitulated.340 AT&T lost their case.341 IBM won theirs.342
Yet, eleven years later on January 28th, 1993, four days after IBM
posted a quarterly loss of $5.46 billion, AT&T reported record
quarterly earnings of $1 billion and a yearly profit of $3.8 billion on
sales of $65 billion.343 Robert Morris, a telecommunications analyst at
Goldman Sachs, correctly predicted that AT&T will be “an awesome
multimedia communications giant by the turn of the century.”344
Robert Allen, the chairman of AT&T, noted, “We were forced by the
divestiture to make changes that probably were good for us . . . . We
went through some tough years, but it paid off. We may have been
more fortunate than I.B.M. in that change was forced on us.”345
Although the decision to break up AT&T was controversial at the time,346
the facts “don’t lie.”347 Since the break-up, the telecommunications field
has gone from high-cost, long-distance phone calls and rotary dial
phones to smart phones, wireless technology, and the development of
the Internet.348 As one account notes of the break-up: “In the aftermath,
AT&T reduced long distance rates by 40% over six years, though local
carriers added access charges that prevented consumers from seeing
all of the cost reduction. The local operating companies . . . also began

340. Id.
341. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (entering a consent decree requiring
AT&T to divest from its regional Baby Bells).
342. In re IBM Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982) (directing the district court to
allow the parties’ stipulation of dismissal to move forward).
343. Stewart, supra note 339, at 38. Note that these effects were before the impact
of the Telecommunication Act of 1996.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL, GROWTH AND
INNOVATION 161 (2013) (noting that the decision to break up AT&T was highly
controversial, with critics arguing that “quality of service would decline, national
security would be endangered, . . . and shareholders would suffer”).
347. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 96–97
(2018) (“Some economists point to lower prices in the wake of the dissolution [of
AT&T], but the real impact[,] [increased innovation,] was . . . far more important.”).
348. See Jay L. Zagorsky, Rise and Fall of the Landline: 143 Years of Telephones Becoming
More Accessible—and Smart, CONVERSATION (Mar. 14, 2019, 6:39 AM) (“Phone call prices
plummeted after the breakup of the U.S. telephone monopoly in the 1980s. And the
invention of technologies like ‘voice over IP’—popularized by Skype—pushed prices
down even further.”).
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offering mobile service in the 1980s after it had been developed by Bell
Labs.”349
As Professor Wu has noted, “It became apparent, in retrospect, just
how much innovation the Bell system monopoly had been holding
back. For out of the carcass of AT&T emerged entirely new types of
industries unimagined or unimaginable during the reign of AT&T.”350
Michael Porter also concluded that telecommunications services
became a hotbed of innovation after that breakup of AT&T.351
Would it have been better for IBM to also have capitulated? Probably!
John Shenefield, President Carter’s Assistant Attorney General in
charge of antitrust from 1977 to 1979, presided over both cases:
[I]f I.B.M. had gone through the divestiture it would have had to
develop new entrepreneurial opportunities. With real competition,
who knows what imagination and creativity that process might have
invited? Competition theorists think the industry as a whole would
have been better off if I.B.M. had been broken up, and if it would
have been better for the public I think it would have been better for
the shareholders, too.352

F. Economic Conclusions: Summary of Probable Gains and Losses
Any summary of probable gains and losses from no-fault or no-action
is problematic. It depends upon empirical data that—because no-fault
has never before been tried—simply does not exist. The best we can
do is to present conclusions from roughly comparable areas and to
make inferences from them that might hold true to some extent. This
uncertainty is true both in general and especially for the effects of nofault on particular industries. Thus, the table below is meant as a guide
for further discussion—not to provide a definitive answer.
The following Table shows the costs and benefits of three possible
policy options: (1) The “Present Status Base Case Costs” column gives
the positives and negatives of the current Section 2 regime (which
requires anticompetitive conduct for a violation); (2) The “Costs of No
Action on Antitrust” column considers what would be likely to happen

349. JOHN M. JORDAN, INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION: RESOURCES FOR
GROWTH IN A CONNECTED WORLD 173 (2012).
350. WU, supra note 347, at 96–97.
351. See MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS: CREATING AND
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 531 (2011) (“The breakup of AT&T . . . has led to
dramatic improvements in service and a rapid rate of innovation . . . .”).
352. Stewart, supra note 339, at 38–39.
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if no Section 2 cases were brought; (3) The “Costs of No-Fault” column
refers to the results if a no-fault policy was implemented. The terms
“smaller” and “larger” refer to costs and benefits of no-fault or no
action compared to the current situation (the “Base Case”).
For example, the first item is “Allocative Loss Due to DWL.” “No
action” would be likely to produce larger allocative losses, and “nofault” would be likely to reduce allocative losses substantially. Of
course, as we have indicated, a summary such as contained in the table
below is speculative. Our goal has been to suggest that a no-fault policy
could well be positive and that it certainly would be worthwhile for the
antitrust field to consider it seriously, not that it is the obvious choice.
Summary Table of Costs of Present Status, No-Action, and No-Fault Policies
Present Status
Costs of No Costs of NoBase Case Costs
Action on
Fault
Antitrust

Allocative Loss Due
to DWL
Allocative Costs
Due to Rentseeking and Higher
Production Costs
Loss Due to less
Innovation
Cost of Cases to
Firms
Cost of Cases to
Prosecutors
International
Competitiveness
Income Inequality
Wealth Transfers to
Monopolists
Privacy Costs

Small

Larger

Smaller

Substantial

Larger

Smaller

Medium

Larger

Smaller

Substantial

Small

Unclear

Substantial

Smaller

Larger

Medium

Larger

Smaller

Substantial
Substantial

Larger
Larger

Smaller
Smaller

Substantial

Larger

Smaller
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VI. SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS ON ANTITRUST LAW
A. Effects on Monopolization Law
Every circa-1890 dictionary and legal treatise cited earlier defined
“monopolize” as simply to acquire a monopoly position, and all of the
earliest Supreme Court Sherman Act cases that used the terms
“monopolize” and “monopoly” equated them.353 None of the early
Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the Sherman Act required
that a “monopoly” or a firm that “monopolized” must have engaged in
anticompetitive conduct.354 Thus, a textualist interpretation of Section
2 is in most respects simple and straightforward.
Nevertheless, a complete analysis of the issue should consider three
issues: (1) Must markets be defined and, if so, could less than a 100%
market share suffice to make a “monopoly” illegal; (2) Does the possibility
of treble damages mean Section 2 is not actually a no-fault statute, and (3)
Do the statute’s criminal penalties mean that Section 2 is really not a nofault statute? All three of these questions should, moreover, be considered
in light of textualism’s “absurdity” doctrine, which prevents statutes from
being interpreted irrationally.355
1. Could less than a 100% market share suffice to make a monopoly illegal?
Applying textualism’s “literalness” doctrine
Would a textualist interpretation of Section 2 require a firm to have
captured a 100% share of its relevant market to “monopolize” the market?
Or could a lower market share suffice, because a textualist would interpret
the term “monopoly” fairly and reasonably, but not literally?
Courts today sometimes find the “monopoly power” required for the
offense of “monopolization” when a firm has significantly less than 100%

353. See supra Section III.A.3 and note 151.
354. See supra Section III.A.3.
355. See supra note 80 (explaining Justice Scalia’s narrow application of the
absurdity doctrine); see also infra Section VI.A.3 (discussing the finer contours of the
absurdity doctrine in textualist interpretation).
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of a market.356 This is because the current requirement is not that the
firm have a 100% complete “monopoly,” but rather that the firm have
the power to “control prices or exclude competition.”357 This ability
can be found in some situations when a firm’s market share is as low as
70%, and possibly even lower.358 Indeed, the vast majority of firms
found to have engaged in illegal monopolization had market shares
significantly less than 100%.359 If a textualist approach to a
“monopolization” violation required a 100% market share, this would
dramatically limit Section 2’s reach.
It is likely, however, that a textualist interpretation of Section 2
would not require a “monopolizing” firm to have 100% of the relevant
market. As noted earlier, textualism does not call for literalism or for
356. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54
OHIO STATE L.J. 115, 150–51 (1993) (“These results imply an ‘average’ monopolist
market share of between seventy-five and eighty-five percent.”).
Moreover, “monopoly” might have been used colloquially the same way—to only
apply to firms with 100% of a market. See, e.g., 1 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE
STANDARD OIL COMPANY 236 (1904) (emphasis added) (“The extent of their (the
Standard’s) business and control over pipe-lines and refineries . . . . by virtue of their
monopoly of the business of refining and transportation of oil[] . . . [made them] at
times almost the only buyers in the market.”) (emphasis added). In referring to the
Standard Oil Company’s beginnings, Tarbell states that after John Rockefeller secured
a lower shipping rate for his company’s oil in 1870, he had achieved a complete
monopoly just a few years later. Id. at 217 (“[I]n December, 1877, after the monopoly
was completed . . . .”) (emphasis added). In 1872, Rockefeller created the South
Improvement Company with the goal of buying and controlling Cleveland oil
refineries to the advantage of the Standard Oil Company. Id. at 57.
The owner of a competing refinery, in explaining why he chose to sell his business
to the South Improvement Company, said it was easier to sell “than fight such a
monopoly.” Id. at 65. As the South Improvement Company grew, the press and the
public heard rumors of its advantageous deals with railroads. Id. at 83–84 (“It was
evident to everybody that if the railroads had made the contracts as charged . . .
nothing but an absolute monopoly of the whole oil business by this combination could
result.”). Finally, Tarbell notes that the Standard Oil Company’s competitors, like the
Pennsylvania Railroad, “raised a cry of monopoly.” Id. at 149.
357. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
358. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 230–31
(8th ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted) (“A market share in excess of 70 percent generally
establishes a prima facie case of monopoly power, at least with evidence of substantial
barriers to entry and evidence that existing competitors could not expand output. In
contrast, courts rarely find monopoly power when market share is less than about 50
percent. The greatest uncertainty exists when market shares are between 50 percent
and 70 percent.”).
359. See Lande, supra note 356, at 148–50 (surveying the market shares of firms held
to be monopolies).
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construing words and phrases strictly.360 Rather, textualists interpret
statutes “fairly,” the way a “reasonable person” would at the time a law was
enacted, and give a statute’s words and phrases their “ordinary” meaning.361
Thus, a textualist would ask how a reasonable person in 1890 would
fairly or ordinarily interpret the word “monopolize.” Would interpreting
Section 2 as only encompassing firms with a 100% market share be the
type of “strict constructionism” or “straightjacketing” that Justice Scalia
denounced?362 After all, a firm with a 98% market share as a practical
matter is usually as likely to have monopoly power as a firm with a 100%
share.363 Indeed, the 1895 Supreme Court E.C. Knight case referred to
a firm with a 98% market share as a “monopoly.”364 Standard Oil in 1911
held that something could be deemed a monopoly if it produced
360. See supra Section II.A.
361. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. Professor May, in one of his
many helpful comments to the authors, noted that:
Charles Whiting Baker’s 1889 Monopolies and the People, at pages 71–72,
declared that ‘in dealing with the question of monopolies we must not
conclude that the absolute control of supply is at all necessary to the existence
of a monopoly.’ Similarly, in 1893, in A Treatise on the Law of Monopolies
and Industrial Trusts, as Administered in England and in the United States of
America, in discussing continuing common law condemnation of the creation
of a monopoly even after an English statute sought to relax statutory
prohibitions against monopolies, Charles Fisk Beach, Sr., declared that the
courts put their own construction upon the enactment and continued to hold
that the creation of a monopoly was an offense at common law. It was held
that in order to create a monopoly, in the legal sense of that term, it was not
necessary to obtain possession of the whole of any product, or even of any
large part of it. It was sufficient that the[re] was engrossing to such an extent
as to enable the holders to increase the price at a specified time and place.
362. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 355–56.
Textualism does not purport to exclude all consideration of purpose or policy
from statutory interpretation. To the contrary, because all statutory language
is at least somewhat open-textured, textualists acknowledge that a “certain
degree of discretion” is inevitable in “most” judicial decisionmaking. When
statutory ambiguity leaves room for the exercise of such discretion, textualists
believe it is appropriate, if not necessary, for an interpreter to consider a
statute’s apparent background purpose or policy implications in choosing
among competing interpretations.
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408 (2003) (footnote
omitted).
363. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 5, 16 (1895) (acknowledging
that a firm need not control all of a market to be a monopoly); see also id. at 44 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant “controls the price of [sugar] everywhere”
by virtue of controlling 98% of the market).
364. Id. at 11, 16.
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“some of its baneful effects,” even if the defendant did not possess a
100% monopoly.365
A “fair reading” of Section 2 should mean that a firm with somewhat
less than 100% of a market that otherwise exhibits the characteristics
of a monopoly should be included within Section 2’s prohibitions. This
is especially true because otherwise a potential defendant usually could
render the monopolization offense a nullity by deliberately leaving 2%
of a market to others.366 As Justice Scalia noted, “Some outcomepertinent consequences . . . are relevant to a sound textual decision—
specifically, those that: [] cause a private instrument or governmental
prescription to[] be ineffective.”367
Moreover, to construe the “monopoly” requirement in a manner that
neutralizes the statute would be an arguably absurd result. As Justice
Scalia368 and Justice Kavanaugh noted, the absurdity doctrine369 can, in truly
extreme situations, prevent statutes from being interpreted irrationally.
Even though the Supreme Court in 1895 was correct to characterize
a firm with a 98% market share as a “monopoly,” it is a difficult judgment
call as to when a reasonable person in 1890 (or today!) would consider
a firm’s market share to be too low to be one. Could a monopolist only

365. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1911) (emphasis
added) (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181) (“[B]y
operation of the mental process which led to considering as a monopoly acts which although
they did not constitute a monopoly were thought to produce some of its baneful effects so also
because of the impediment or burden to the due course of trade which they produced,
such acts came to be referred to as in restraint of trade . . . . [B]y the common law
monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of
contract and their injury to the public . . . . And that at common law the evils
consequent upon engrossing, etc., caused those things to be treated as coming within
monopoly, and sometimes to be called monopoly, and the same considerations caused
monopoly, because of its operation and effect, to be brought within and spoken of
generally as impeding the due course of or being in restraint of trade.”). We are
indebted to Prof. Meese for directing us to this and many other relevant references.
Of course, Standard Oil was issued twenty-one years after the Sherman Act was passed,
so it should carry less weight than a more contemporaneous opinion.
366. See Diane Capri, John D. Rockefeller: Creative or Killer?, DIANE CAPRI (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://dianecapri.com/2016/12/john-rockefeller-creative-or-criminal (quoting John
D. Rockefeller as saying “the only reason he didn’t take over 100% of the world’s oil
refining market was because he didn’t want public sentiment to be 100% negative against
him”).
367. Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 352.
368. Id. at 234.
369. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2156–57.
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have a market share of 88%, the percent of the U.S. oil market
possessed by the Standard Oil Trust in 1890?370
Should the 70% minimum that usually suffices today continue to be
the benchmark? A minimum or virtually-always minimum line should
be drawn, but where? Indeed, would a reasonable person instead just
conclude that if a firm had the power to “control prices or exclude
competition,”371 then it is for all practical purposes a monopoly? Perhaps
the monopoly power standard for Section 2 should not change.
2. Treble damages for a no-fault violation: absurd or appropriate?
Would it be “absurd” to impose treble damages on a firm that was
not found to have engaged in anticompetitive conduct? Does the
possibility of a private treble damages action mean that Section 2 could
not have been intended to be a no-fault statute? Would this be the type
of “absurd” result that Justice Scalia cautions should not result from
textualism?372
Reasonable people certainly can disagree over whether treble
damages would be too large for a no-fault violation. It often is believed
that treble damages were necessary to give victims the requisite incentive
to bring and litigate cases against large and powerful defendants, as well
as to deter violations optimally.373 This is especially true because Section
2 antitrust violations and damages often are so difficult to detect and
prove.374 Regardless whether a contemporary judge or justice thought
this policy position was wise, should they find it to be absurd?
The “treble damages” remedy should be considered an approach
that reasonable policy makers might implement, regardless whether it
is considered from a deterrence or a compensation perspective. This
is especially true because if antitrust law’s so-called “treble damages”
remedy is analyzed empirically, with consideration given to its lack of

370. Mark V. Siegler, An Economic History of the United States: Connecting the
Present with the Past 207 (2017). One might even ask whether Congress would have
considered it “absurd” if Rockefeller were not found to have “monopolized” the oil
industry as this term was used in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
371. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)
(stating that monopoly power is the power to “control prices or exclude competition”).
372. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia’s
narrow approach to the absurdity doctrine).
373. Lande, supra note 356, at 124 (summarizing the prevailing “Optimal Deterrence
Framework” theory of antitrust damages).
374. See id. at 129 nn.54–55 (noting the reasons for disparities between damages
caused and damages awarded in antitrust cases).
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prejudgment interest, lack of payments for the allocative inefficiency
effects or umbrella effects of monopoly pricing, and other factors, even
a “treble damages” award is probably on average really only around
single damages.375 In other words, a monopolist paying nominal damages
of three times its overcharges would probably only be paying one times
the actual damages it caused.
Moreover, private antitrust cases rarely produce even nominal treble
damages for victims of anticompetitive behavior.376 Even in cartel cases,
as a practical matter most private cases settle, and the settlements
average only 37% to 66% of single damages.377 Only 20% settled for
single damages or more.378
If a court did believe that the prospect of awarding treble damages
in a no-fault case was absurd, it could do what courts often do even in
routine cases where fault has been established but the court believed
it would be unjust to order “excessive” damages. Professor William
Kovacic pointed out that in many circumstances,
[A] court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful
private plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence.
A court might seek to correct such perceived infirmities in the antitrust system by recourse to means directly within its control—namely
by modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by devising
special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims.379

Using these same techniques, as a practical matter, courts would be
extremely unlikely to award even nominal treble damages in a no-fault
monopolization case.380 A court which believed this result to be absurd
easily could avoid this outcome.
375. See id. at 162 tbl.2.
376. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are
Mostly Less than Single Damages, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2015) (noting that almost
every successful antitrust damages action settles for less than treble damages).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74; see also Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About
Antitrust Damages, 40 S.F. L. REV. 651, 663, n.49 (2006) (analyzing this and other sources
making similar points).
380. If a no-fault case reached the damages stage, the measurement issues might be
simpler than in other Section 2 cases. In a fault-based Section 2 case, courts have to
determine the overall monopoly profits, but award only those monopoly profits
attributed to the anticompetitive conduct. This parsing is extremely difficult. Under
no-fault, the court would just have to determine the total monopoly overcharges.
Moreover, for similar reasons, structural remedies have been relatively unusual in
Section 2 cases and have traditionally been saved for the most egregious violations. See
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3. Criminal sanctions for a no-fault case? Applying the absurdity doctrine
The Sherman Act of 1890 contained criminal penalties. A violation
of Section 1 or 2 could result in a $5,000 fine and a year in prison (a
misdemeanor at the time).381 A reasonable person might ask whether
the inclusion of possible criminal penalties for a Section 2 violation
meant that Congress did not intend for it to be a no-fault statute and
thus argue that a no-fault interpretation of Section 2 is “absurd.”
This is incorrect for three reasons: (1) While Congress would have
thought it “absurd” to imprison a tiny monopolist that was not believed
to affect interstate commerce, Congress might not have thought it
absurd to imprison a “robber baron” like John D. Rockefeller; (2)
There are many other plausible reasons why Congress could have
included criminal penalties in a no-fault statute; and (3) Other
antitrust laws could be applied criminally in ways that could lead to
absurd results, but this does not mean these laws were not meant to
apply at all to the types of conduct in question.
First, one might ask what would have happened during the floor
debates if a senator had asked whether a manufacturer achieving a
monopoly in a small market by making a better product could be put
in prison under Section 2.382 Similarly, suppose there were a small town
supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text. Surely structural relief would not be the
norm in no-fault cases.
381. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51–647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)). For the history of the Sherman Act, see D.
Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1554–55
(2019).
382. One might ask: “Does the language of Section 2 suggest that Congress meant
for the Department of Justice to prosecute, and for juries to convict, executives of all
companies that achieved monopoly positions? And of course, what about the
companies themselves? If Congress did not intend for there to be an ‘efficiency’
defense, doesn’t it follow that criminal prosecutions of individual executives in charge
of monopolists (however the monopoly was attained) would be fair game for criminal
sanctions?
“Alternatively, wasn’t the judicial interpretation of the statute to require ‘bad acts’
inevitable in light of the criminal nature of the Sherman Act? A textualist interpretation
of the 1890 legislation would mean that criminal remedies would be available to
prosecute firms and individuals who achieved their preeminence without fault.
“Imagine an extension to the floor debates in 1890: Question for Senator Edmunds:
‘Suppose I make the best buggy whip you ever saw. Nobody else comes close. I am a
monopolist. Have I violated Section 2 of the draft statute, and can I be sent to jail for
the offense?’ What would Edmonds have said in reply?”
The authors are grateful to Professor Kovacic for suggesting this hypothetical and
many other insights.
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with only two barbers, and one of them died. The surviving barber
would be a monopolist. Could this barber have been prosecuted
criminally?383 Do these possibilities mean that Section 2 was never
intended to be a no-fault statute?
Recall that a textualist analysis should ignore the legislative debates,
but that they should consider the “history of the times.”384 A textualist
should use the history of the period producing the antitrust laws to help
ascertain what Congress meant when it used a term like “monopolize”
and decided to impose sanctions on firms that monopolized.
The absurdity doctrine could be appropriate if either of these two
hypotheticals (involving the small innovative company or the last
barber in town) actually occurred. A textualist could reason that the
types of monopolies that were the target of the Sherman Act were
extremely large firms like the Standard Oil Trust.385 This is especially
true because the very definition of “interstate commerce” was so
restricted in 1890 that the Sherman Act would not have governed the
activities of a monopoly-barber in a small town.386
A textualist might also ask whether ordinary Americans in 1890 fairly
could have assumed the law could have been used to impose criminal
sanctions on small town barbers or small firms that succeeded through
innovation. This is especially true due to the belief by Scalia and others
that ambiguous statutes should be read in a manner that does not
result in a criminal sanction.387
But the absurdity doctrine should not rescue the CEOs of companies
like the Standard Oil Trust even if Section 2 was being used on a nofault basis. During the late 19th and early 20th Centuries many called
383. The authors are grateful to James May for suggesting this hypothetical and
many other insights.
384. See supra note 72.
385. See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2279, 2280, 2334 (2013) (noting that calls to break up trusts in the 1880s were
the result of shifts in income distribution that “accompanied the rapid industrialization
of the decade”); Lande, supra note 37, at 96–105 (discussing the relevant history of the
time when Congress enacted the Sherman Act).
386. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1888) (distinguishing commerce and
manufacturing within the regulation of “interstate commerce” and ruling that
manufacturing was not considered a part of “interstate commerce”). The incredibly
restrictive application of the term “interstate commerce” in 1890, when Congress
passed the Sherman Act, surely meant that the Sherman Act similarly would not have
been intended to include the only barber in a small town.
387. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 296 (“Ambiguity in a statute defining a
crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”).
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not just for an investigation into the activities of John D. Rockefeller,
in 1890 the head of the Standard Oil Trust, but his imprisonment.388
Would imprisoning Rockefeller even on a no-fault theory really have
been “absurd” in the minds of these people, any more “absurd” than
what some politicians have called for recently? Some contemporary
politicians have not just called for an investigation into whether certain
large and powerful high-tech companies engaged in anticompetitive

388. Keith Poole, Biography: John D. Rockefeller, Senior, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/americanexperience/features/rockefellers-john
[https://perma.cc/S8DCB9DZ]. For example, in 1894 the Governor of Texas wanted to arrest John D.
Rockefeller for violating the Texas Antitrust laws. See Condensed Dispatches, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1894, at 7 (“A requisition has been made by the Governor of Texas upon Gov.
Flower, of New York, for the arrest of John D. Rockefeller . . . for violation of the Texas
anti-trust law.”); see also Called Rockefeller Names, CAMAS PRAIRIE CHRONICLE, Aug. 4, 1905
(quoting the then-governor of Wisconsin as saying “John D. Rockefeller is the greatest
criminal of the age,” a declaration that was met with cheers); Fearful of Arrest, DAILY
LEADER, Apr. 10, 1895 (“John D. Rockefeller does not dare to leave New York for fear
of arrest on warrants already issued in the various states”); Jail Rockefeller and Other Trust
Magnates, Says Bryan, LANCASTER NEWS, July 10, 1907 (quoting William J. Bryan, the
Democratic nominee for President in 1896 and 1900, as saying “Send John D.
Rockefeller and a dozen other trust magnates to prison for a long term of years and
one of the most vital questions before the people will have been solved”); Rockefeller a
Highwayman, EVENING STATESMAN, Dec. 19, 1903 (“Ther[e] is no difference in principle
between holding up a nation for $1,000,000 at the mouth of a pipe line and holding
up an individual at the muzzle of a gun for what he has on his person. The man who
is looked on as the most successful man in the country is, in the last analysis, a gambler
or highway robber. He is not even a creator of money, much less of manhood, but a
highway bandit who has held up producers and public for millions. . . . John D.
Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan and men of their class in the financial world are
really responsible for such a reign of crime as now exists in Chicago . . . .”); Sage and
Rockefeller, EVENING STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1905, at 4 (“Rockefeller in his business lifetime
has destroyed the old way of doing business. He has substituted combination for
competition; secrecy for publicity; mendacity for truth; bribery for brains. He buys
lawyers who buy for him laws: he crushes rivals relentlessly or kills them by the slower
torture of starvation. The mere fact that a rival exists is reason enough for killing him.
Mr. Rockefeller is a law unto himself. Is it a wonder that he is hated, feared and
admired? . . . [Rockefeller is like a] boa constrictor.”); Try the Criminal Law, TIMES &
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 14, 1908, at 2 (“If the government in its pretended war on the
Standard Oil and other trusts would invoke the aid of the criminal law[] . . . it would
accomplish something. If old John D. Rockefeller, for instance, was sent to prison for
twenty-four hours for violating the trust law, you would soon see a change, and the
trusts would soon be all good.”); Walsh Urges Prison for Rockefellers, SUN, July 12, 1915, at
3 (“If the next Congress represents the people of the United States, its first act will be
to cite before it John D. Rockefeller . . . and if these men continue to defy the nation
they should be indicted for crime against the Government and sent to jail.”).
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conduct: Bernie Sanders declared he would use the Sherman Act to
“jail” CEOs of “monopolistic companies.”389
Some may denounce Senator Sanders’s plan as foolish on policy
grounds. And we could speculate about what a politician like Senator
Sanders actually would do if he were elected president and could enact
legislation he favored. However, his harsh rhetoric reminds us that
political views of many Americans towards alleged monopolies at times
have been extremely antagonistic.390
Second, Congress might have enacted a law containing criminal
penalties with full knowledge that they would be unlikely to be applied
vigorously or at all. During the early years of the Sherman Act,
corporate executives were not sent to prison for any antitrust offenses.
No corporate official was imprisoned, even for price fixing, until more
than thirty years after the Sherman Act was passed.391 No corporate
official has ever been imprisoned for any Section 2 offense,392 and
during its early years Section 2 seldom was enforced, even civilly.393
Section 2’s framers might well have included criminal provisions

389. Ryan Grim, Bernie Sanders Vows to Revive Criminal Prosecutions of CEOs for Unfair
Trade Practices, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/
10/23/bernie-sanders-sherman-antitrust-act-monopolies/ [https://perma.cc/8VJR-KMUL].
In a statement to The Intercept, Sen[ator] Elizabeth Warren’s campaign said
she would also pursue criminal prosecutions of monopolists under the
Sherman Act. “When she’s president, Elizabeth will enforce our antitrust laws
to their fullest extent including their criminal provisions. She will also break
up Big Tech, break up Big Ag[riculture], and break up Big Banks,” said
spokesperson Saloni Sharma.
Id.; see also Hirsch, supra note 16.
390. Lydia Saad, Do Americans Like or Dislike ‘Big Business’?, GALLUP (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/270296/americans-dislike-bigbusiness.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/6TWW-Y9S5] (reporting that roughly
half of the country has negative views of big business); see also supra note 385 (showing
Rockefeller’s opinions).
391. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1555 (footnote omitted) (“Members of cartels were
incarcerated once in 1921, but not again until 1959.”). One necessary element for a
criminal conviction is mens rea: “The general rule of law is that a person cannot be
convicted and punished in a proceeding of a criminal nature unless it can be shown
that he had a guilty mind.” A.M. WILSHERE, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 6–7 (2d ed. 1911). This requirement would, however, be met in Section 2
cases because only “competent age, sanity, freedom from some kinds of coercion[,]
and to some extent knowledge of fact are essential to criminality.” Id. at 7.
392. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1570.
393. Id. at 1571.
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without giving them much thought, or perhaps only as a threat,394 or
only for political reasons.
It certainly is possible that Congress did not give much thought to
whether, on policy grounds, Section 2 should contain criminal
sanctions. Regardless, all this is speculation that a textualist should not
engage in.395 If a judge re-interpreted the words of a statute because they
believed it was unwise policy to impose criminal penalties in a no-fault
case, this would not be textualism.396
Third, the possibility that a prosecutor would attempt to secure
criminal penalties in a no-fault case against a major U.S. corporation

394. For a recent example of the seriousness with which Big Tech leaders take these
threats, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, called Warren’s presidential campaign
and her desire to break up Big Tech an “existential threat.” Lauren Feiner, Zuckerberg
Blasts Elizabeth Warren’s Plan to Break up Facebook and Says It’s an ‘Existential’ Threat, CNBC
(Oct. 1, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/01/audio-from-zuckerbergmeeting-with-facebook-employees-leaked.html [https://perma.cc/Z4HM-URV5].
Zuckerberg and Warren traded blows in discussing a potential antitrust suit:
“I would bet that we will win the legal challenge,” [Zuckerberg] said. “Does
that still suck for us? Yeah. I mean, I don’t want to have a major lawsuit against
our own government . . . . But . . . if someone’s going to try to threaten
something that existential, you go to the mat and you fight.” Warren hit back
on Twitter. “What would really ‘suck’ is if we don’t fix a corrupt system that
lets giant companies like Facebook engage in illegal anticompetitive practices,
stomp on consumer privacy rights, and repeatedly fumble their responsibility
to protect our democracy,” she wrote.
Adrian Carrasquillo, Why Elizabeth Warren Is the VP Pick Facebook Doesn’t Want to See,
NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2020, 5:02 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/why-elizabethwarren-vp-pick-facebook-doesnt-want-see-1513754 [https://perma.cc/3Z6R-2ZFR].
395. Even if the above hypothetical dialogue had occurred, and one of the bill’s
sponsors had said, “Do you realize this bill could put a monopolist in prison even
though he did nothing wrong,” the dialogue would be irrelevant because a textualist
ignores legislative history. Perhaps if this hypothetical has been considered by
Congress it would have resulted in the law being changed. But this is the kind of
speculation a textualist should not engage in. Similarly, a textualist does not attempt
to put themselves in the hypothetical “mind of Congress” and determine what would
have been logical to a reasonable congressperson, other than by a fair and
straightforward reading of a statute’s language. As Justice Scalia noted, it is a “false
notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a statute, the court should
reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it confronted the issue.” SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 38, at 349. A textualist would not ask how a hypothetical member
of Congress would have responded if someone had asked them, “Are you sure you
want to put people in prison for violating every part of the statute? Maybe instead you
should only impose criminal penalties for Section 1 violations.” A textualist would deal
with the statute that is in front of them.
396. Id.
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like Amazon, Facebook, or Google would be no more “absurd” than
three other types of criminal antitrust cases that have been or could be
brought under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act397: in tiny collusion
cases, RPM cases, and Robinson-Patman Act cases.
First, suppose two tiny businesses sell the same products (such as
bicycles) and they are on the opposite ends of a large metropolitan
area. Assume they fixed prices. Assume interstate commerce was
impacted and their agreement did not result in significant efficiencies.
If the government charged them with a criminal Section 1 violation,
they would not be able to defend on the basis that no prices actually
increased, that they competed with internet sales, that entry was easy,
etc.398 They would be guilty of a felony.399 Apparently no criminal
prosecution of this nature ever has taken place. But if it did, would a
court conclude that Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not cover price
fixing? Or would it instead act as Professor Kovacic noted, that courts
sometimes find a way to exonerate defendants, or at least to subject
them to no more than a nominal penalty, in situations where they
believe that harsh remedies are inappropriate.400
Second, in 1980, the Department of Justice, followed by fifteen state
Attorneys General, prosecuted RPM criminally in United States v.
Cuisinarts, Inc.,401 and succeeded in obtaining a nolo contendere plea
and a $250,000 fine.402 At the time RPM was per se illegal, but today it
is judged under the rule of reason,403 and many respected scholars
believe it should be taken off the list of antitrust offenses entirely.404
Nevertheless, in theory, RPM could today be prosecuted criminally. If
this were to happen, surely the court handling the case would do as
Professor Kovacic described and find some way to exonerate the
defendant or treat them leniently.405 This is precisely what would

397. 15 U.S.C. § 12–27 (2018).
398. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 358, at 224, 233, 235, 243–45.
399. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
400. See Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74.
401. No. H80-559, 1981 WL 2062 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 1981).
402. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1009–10
(D. Conn. 1981), aff’d, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981).
403. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
404. See id.
405. See Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74 (noting how courts have interpreted
antitrust laws in ways resulting in no liability when uneasy with the imposed penalties).
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happen if the Department of Justice tried to prosecute a monopolist
criminally under a no-fault theory.406
In addition, the Robinson-Patman Act, which prevents certain
instances of price discrimination, contains criminal penalties407 which
were last imposed in the 1950s.408 This statute has fallen into severe
bipartisan disrepute today, and the government has barely enforced it
civilly for a generation.409 Nevertheless, like tiny collusion cases and
RPM cases, the federal government could today pursue criminal
enforcement under the Robinson-Patman Act.
If any of these violations were prosecuted criminally today, not only
could the courts do as Professor Kovacic suggested and find some way
to exonerate the defendant—there are other methods courts could use
to achieve justice. Professor Sokol persuasively argues that any attempt
to impose criminal penalties on an alleged antitrust violation after an
unduly long period of non-criminal enforcement could result in a
successful defense of the doctrine of desuetude (void due to nonuse),410 or in a due process violation of the U.S. Constitution where the
provision would be held void for vagueness and a lack of notice.411
406. One might also ask: “Suppose DOJ tried to prosecute individuals criminally for
no-fault offenses. Would this destroy the statute by creating massive political backlash?”
This certainly is a possibility. At a minimum it would ruin the reputation of the
enforcer who attempted it. But it is not relevant to the textualist interpretation of
Section 2. Similarly, a Supreme Court interpretation of Section 2 as a no-fault statute
similarly might spur congress to amend the Sherman Act, in ways that might or might
not be confined to a narrow change in Section 2, with uncertain results.
The authors are grateful to Professors Kovacic and May for these and many other
thoughtful insights.
407. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2018); see also Sokol, supra note 381, at 1573 (reviewing the
history of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement).
408. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1573.
409. Id. (“There has been only a single government enforcement action of
Robinson-Patman since the George H.W. Bush administration.”).
410. Id. at 1564 (footnotes omitted) (“Desuetude is a concept where a practice that
has been fixed by law loses its authority due to a lack of usage. When this lack of usage
has been long enough, a ‘negative custom’ of nonusage replaces the usage of the law.
Nonusage for a lengthy period of time suggests either that the legal practice is obsolete
or was never legitimate in the first place.”); see id. at 1564–76 (providing an insightful
analysis of desuetude in an antitrust context).
411. Id. at 1576 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (“Void for vagueness is
a doctrine where the law in question is too vague to provide notice of the type of
conduct that is to be deemed illegal. The linkage between desuetude and vagueness is
that ‘[a] penal enactment which is linguistically clear, but has been notoriously
ignored by both its administrators and the community for an unduly extended period,
imparts no more fair notice of its proscriptions than a statute which is phrased in vague
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Under either doctrine, a firm prosecuted by the Department of Justice
for a no-fault violation today could argue that it lacked the intent
necessary for a criminal violation. Professor Sokol also argues that an
“accidental” monopolist (assuming, consistent with Professor Turner,
that accidental monopolists exist), would lack the intent necessary for
a criminal or even a civil law monopolization violation.412
Even the theoretical possibility of criminal sanctions resulting from
a no-fault case is an undesirable feature of Section 2. But as Justice
Scalia noted concerning the interpretation of statutes, “[w]hen once
the meaning is plain, it is not the province of a court to scan its wisdom
or its policy.”413
In summary, a textualist interpretation of Section 2 shows that a
violation does not require anticompetitive conduct. Nor should the
“monopolization” offense be limited to firms with 100% market shares.
This is true even though in theory—although not as a practical matter—
a no-fault case could result in treble damages or criminal penalties.
B. Effects on “Attempt to Monopolize” Law
A textualist interpretation of the “attempt to monopolize” language
in Section 2 should greatly restore the statute’s vigor. Defendants would
terms.’”); see also id. at 1576–96 (analyzing persuasively the void for vagueness doctrine
and the fair warning requirement as applied to antitrust laws). Professor Sokol
elaborates further that:
In Lanier, the U.S. Supreme Court offered guidance as to the ‘three related
manifestations of the fair warning requirement’ that are required whether or
not a criminal statute may be unconstitutionally vague. These include: (1) the
vagueness doctrine, (2) the rule of lenity, and (3) retroactive application of a
new construction of the statute. The purpose of the fair warning requirements
is to ensure that the ‘statute, either standing alone or as construed, ma[k]e[s]
it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was
criminal.
Id. at 1580 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
412. Email from D. Daniel Sokol, Professor, U. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, to
Robert H. Lande, Professor, U. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Nov. 5, 2020) (on file with
author).
413. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 353 (quoting G. GRANVILLE SHARP & BRIAN
GALPIN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 5 (10th ed. 1953)); see also
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1827 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(“Justice Scalia explained the extraordinary importance of hewing to the ordinary
meaning of a phrase: Adhering to the fair meaning of the text (the textualist’s
touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text.
In the words of Learned Hand: ‘a sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the forest for the
trees.’”) (internal quotations omitted).
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only be required to engage in a serious and concrete “attempt” to gain
a monopoly,414 a requirement that should be construed as requiring
only the intent to take over a market, planning and preparation, and
one concrete, significant act in furtherance of this intent. The act
could be required to be “sufficient, both in magnitude and in
proximity to the fact intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law
that does not concern itself with things trivial and small.”415
What type of act would be required in which market contexts? This
would be as difficult to define precisely as the current requirements for
the offense. And the necessary lines would be as difficult to draw.
Would market definition and a “dangerous probability of success”
be required under a textualist approach to the attempt to monopolize
portion of Section 2? The statute makes it unlawful for any person to
“attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States.”416 A straightforward textualist reading of the statute
therefore could be very similar to Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.’s417 reading
of Section 2 in a way that eliminated both the dangerous probability418
and the market definition requirements419 in attempted monopolization
cases. Alternatively, a court could reason that defendants are only
prohibited from attempting to monopolize something, so market definition
is required.
Moreover, the attempted monopolization doctrine could be applied
only to firms attempting to take over an entire market—or, since a
textualist should not construe the word “monopoly” literally or
strictly,420 perhaps a firm attempting to take over virtually all of a
market. Suppose, for example, a firm with 50% of a relevant market
conceived of and attempted to implement a serious plan that would, if

414. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 353.
415. See BISHOP, supra note 163, § 728; supra Section III.B; see also Lessig v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir. 1964), abrogated by, Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) (stating that “probability of actual monopolization” is
not an “essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize).
416. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added).
417. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964).
418. Id. at 474 (rejecting the notion that a “[dangerous] probability of actual
monopolization is an essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize”).
419. Id. at 474 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (“When the charge is attempt
(or conspiracy) to monopolize, rather than monopolization, the relevant market is ‘not
in issue.’ Section 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize ‘any part’ of commerce . . . .”).
420. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
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successful, give it 70% of that market.421 This is far short of a 100%
market share, and this defendant arguably should not be convicted of
attempted monopolization.422 Alternatively, since a 70% market share
is the minimum that usually suffices today to meet the “monopoly
power” prong of monopolization cases,423 perhaps a firm should be
guilty of attempted monopolization if its implemented plan would, if
successful, give it 70% of a market? Or 90%?
Although the courts would of course have to draw a line, this line
should be different from the line courts draw today, which requires
defendants to have a “dangerous probability”424 of acquiring monopoly
power. Today, a firm with only 50% of the market could only rarely
meet the “dangerous probability” threshold, and a firm with only a
30% market share could never or almost never meet the threshold.425
Today, very few attempted monopolization suits are successful.426 But
under a textualist analysis a firm with a 50% market share often should

421. Although firms’ plans to expand market share significantly (but remain far
short of a 100% share) may be common, courts should of course be skeptical of
manufactured self-serving evidence that a defendant was not actually trying to achieve
complete control of a market. As an example of a plan not to gain complete control
of a market, in the FTC case against DuPont involving the titanium dioxide market,
the defendant had approximately a 40% market share and engaged in conduct
designed to give it approximately 60% of the relevant market. It never had an
actionable plan to reach a 100% market share. See F.T.C. Case on Du Pont Dismissed, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 1979) https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/18/archives/ftc-case-ondu-pont-dismissed-judge-finds-no-monopoly-bid-largest.html?auth=link-dismissgoogle1tap, at D5.
422. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 358, at 230–31.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 336. The “dangerous probability” requirement comes from Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), where Justice Holmes noted the common law
origin of the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction between mere
preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law.” Id. at 402. His “dangerous
probability [of success]” formulation is of only limited help in ascertaining which
conduct should suffice.
425. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 298–99
(4th ed. 1997) (footnotes omitted) (“Although there are no precise market share
boundaries, and while [defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy competition in that
market, intent, etc.] affect the analysis, courts often find a dangerous probability [of
monopolization] where the defendant starts with a market share of more than 50
percent; they rarely find market shares between 30 percent and 50 percent sufficient;
and they virtually never find shares of less than 30 percent sufficient.”).
426. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2010–
2019, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/3RCNV5PU].
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be found to engage in a serious “attempt to monopolize” a market, given
certain assumptions like barriers to entry.
In sum, a textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” portion
of Section 2 should not require defendant to have undertaken
anticompetitive conduct. The statute should only require that defendant
had the intent to acquire a monopoly (or a near-monopoly) and had
taken a serious, significant and concrete step in this direction. A
defendant’s market share as low as 50%, and perhaps even 30%,
assuming barriers to entry, etc., should sometimes suffice.
The line of illegality would, as a practical matter, be as uncertain as
the current “dangerous probability” requirement.427 But the textualist
version of the “dangerous probability” requirement should allow more
successful cases. And the lack of an anticompetitive conduct element
should permit many more successful cases.
C. No-Fault Monopolization as a Violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act
Despite the existence of the Sherman Act, Congress in 1914 decided
that additional, more encompassing, legislation was needed, so it
enacted Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of
competition.”428 A traditionalist analysis of Section 5 of the FTC Act
demonstrates that the statute was intended to prohibit not only every
violation of the Sherman Act, but also (1) incipient violations of this
law, (2) conduct violating the spirit of the Sherman Act, and (3)
conduct violating recognized standards of business behavior.429 The

427. As Oliver Wendall Holmes noted in his discussion of attempts:
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line . . . . the
considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the greatness of
the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. When a man buys matches to
fire a haystack . . . there is still a considerable chance that he will change his
mind before he comes to the point. But when he has struck the match . . .
there is very little chance that he will not persist to the end . . . .
HOLMES, JR., supra note 165, at 68–69.
428. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
429. See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 299–300 (1980).
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Supreme Court has explicitly adopted this interpretation of the FTC
Act,430 although the relevant precedent is more than a generation old.431
Although the task is beyond the scope of this article, the FTC Act
should be analyzed in a textualist manner to determine whether the
statute would still produce these interpretations of the phrase “unfair
methods of competition.” If so, the FTC Act might be an optimal
vehicle for no-fault monopolization for several reasons.
Section 5 is a civil statute—its violation cannot result in criminal
penalties.432 Section 5 actions cannot be brought by private parties, and
do not constitute Sherman Act precedent that gives rise to treble
damages liability unless the court specifically finds that the practices at
issue also violate the Sherman Act.433
Section 5 could be used as a way to implement no-fault if the Court
is willing to undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2 but is reluctant
to overturn Trinko and other Section 2 precedent. Another reason for
the use of Section 5 to impose sanctions on monopolies would arise if
the Court is willing to re-think Section 2 using a textualist approach,
but decides to do so in a relatively non-expansive manner because it
does not want no-fault cases to be brought by private parties, or for
there to be even a theoretical fear that no-fault could lead to criminal
penalties.
The FTC Act could be a perfect vehicle for a textualist court that is
reluctant for any of these reasons to find that a firm violated Section 2
of the Sherman Act under a no-fault theory. Instead, the Court might
hold that defendant had committed an incipient violation of Section
2, or a violation of the spirit of Section 2, and thus that the firm had
violated Section 5 of the FTC Act using a no-fault approach. A textualist
Court might well find that Section 5, but not Section 2, imposes
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize.

430. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972) (stating
that Congress intended for the FTC to have broad power to proscribe business
practices even if such practices are not anticompetitive but instead “unfair or
deceptive”).
431. The Supreme Court’s most recent expansive interpretation of Section 5 was in
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Id. at 454 (characterizing section 5 as
including traditional antitrust violations and also “practices that the Commission
determines are against public policy for other reasons”).
432. See Averitt, supra note 429, at 251 n.112.
433. Id.
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CONCLUSION: AN INCREASINGLY TEXTUALIST SUPREME COURT SHOULD
IMPLEMENT NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION
For many years, textualism was only the concern of Justice Scalia and
academics not within the antitrust mainstream. Even conservative
members of the antitrust community rejected or ignored this method
of statutory analysis. But in recent years, textualism increasingly has
emerged from the shadows. Indeed, in 2020, all nine justices, in all three
opinions in an important Supreme Court case, employed textualism.434
Bostock certainly increases the hope of the possibility that the Court also
will analyze Section 2 of the Sherman Act using textualist principles.435
This possibility is especially true because a textualist approach might
even appeal to those justices who normally are not textualists. This is
because a traditional or purposivist approach to Section 2 is ambiguous
on the no-fault issue.436 If a traditional analysis of Section 2 had found
that anticompetitive conduct was required for a violation, but a textual

434. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1754, 1822 (2020).
435. See Krishnakumar, supra note 58, at 228–33 (providing a pre-Bostock chart with
a breakdown of judicial decisions involving a textualist approach and which Justice
authored each one). Krishakumar considers Justice Thomas a “textualist” and Justices
Roberts and Alito as “textualist-leaning.” Id. at 163 n.18. If Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh are additionally considered textualists, it appears that the Supreme Court
has 5 textualist or “textualist-leaning” Justices. See Lovelace, supra note 6 (quoting
Justice Elena Kagan as saying, “[W]e are a generally, fairly textualist court.”). Similarly,
Bryan Garner’s 2019 pre-Bostock ABA Journal posting characterized the approach of
two Justices not usually considered textualists, Justice Breyer and the late Justice
Ginsburg, as looking primarily to text. Bryan A. Garner, Old-Fashioned Textualism Is All
About Interpretation, Not Legislating from the Bench, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 1:15 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/textualism-means-what-it-says
[https://perma.cc/XCJ4-LE6T]. Garner asserted that they typically analyze
interpretive questions by focusing on four elements in this order: (1) text, (2)
structure, (3) purpose, and (4) legislative history. Id.
436. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. A no-fault analysis of Section 2
would, moreover, be consistent with the thoughts of Justice Brandeis:
[N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained by
efficiency alone . . . . It will be found that wherever competition has been
suppressed it has been due either to resort to ruthless processes, or by
improper use of inordinate wealth and power. The attempt to dismember
existing illegal trusts is not, therefore, an attempt to interfere in any way with
the natural law of business. It is an endeavor to restore health by removing a
cancer from the body industrial.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS BRANDEIS
114–16 (Osmond K. Fraenkel, ed. 1965).
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analysis did not, the traditionalists on the court would of course be less
likely to embrace textualism. But this tradeoff is not present.
There is an old saying that “th[e] [S]upreme [Cou]rt follows th[e]
[ele]ction returns.”437 Is there even a small chance the current
conservative—but increasingly textualist—Supreme Court would hold
that Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not require anticompetitive
conduct? If in the future an election gives our country a President and
a Congress that, like some politicians today,438 believe in imposing
sanctions on all monopolies, is there even a small chance the Supreme
Court (or a future, changed Supreme Court) might be open to the
possibility that the Sherman Act (or perhaps the FTC Act439) is a no-fault
statute?
Everyone agrees that courts should faithfully interpret and
implement the words of statutes when they are clear.440 But whether a
statute is “clear” often is in the mind of the judge.441 As a practical
matter, the Court’s view regarding whether the Sherman Act is a nofault statute could depend in part upon what particular justices think
about the net economic effects of sanctioning all monopolies. As
Justice Kavanaugh noted, the “absurdity doctrine”442 prevents statutes
from being interpreted irrationally. If a majority of Supreme Court
justices believe that no-fault is, from an economic perspective,
“absurd,” they surely won’t find that the Sherman Act embodies a
congressional intent to impose sanctions on all monopolies. Although
the Court surely would not convict a tiny local monopoly or a modestly
sized innovative company of a no-fault violation, a court might not find
this doctrine “absurd” if it were applied to such extremely large alleged
contemporary monopolies as Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.443

437. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
438. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text.
439. Use of the FTC Act would have the advantage that its violation cannot result in
criminal penalties, and a violation of the Act does not automatically lead to private
cases with their potential for treble damages. Moreover, the Court would not have to
overturn an FTC Act precedent as clear as Trinko. See supra Section V.C.
440. See Scalia, supra note 57, at 16 (“[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the
end of the matter.”).
441. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2118–19. As Justice Kagan noted, “[P]retty
much all of us now look at the text first and the text is what matters most . . . . And if
you can find clarity in the text that’s pretty much the end of the ballgame. Often texts
are not clear, you have to look [farther].” See Lovelace, supra note 6.
442. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2156–57.
443. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
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The justices may believe, as we do, that reasonable people can
disagree over no-fault’s net economic effects. This Article has shown
that no-fault’s overall net effects on economic welfare depend upon a
number of empirical issues whose effects are unknown and ambiguous
from both an overall perspective and in particular contexts. If the
justices believe that the net effects of no-fault are close from an
economic perspective, and not “absurd,” they should be more likely to
implement a “fair reading” of the words of Section 2 and impose
sanctions on all monopolies. We wrote this Article because we believe
these issues deserve thoughtful analysis and debate.444
In 2016, (then) Judge Gorsuch observed: “[A] judge who likes every
result he reaches is very likely a bad judge, reaching for results he
prefers rather than those the law compels.”445 If the current
conservative Supreme Court does not want Section 2 of the Sherman
Act to impose sanctions on all monopolies, it should heed the more
recent advice of Justice Gorsuch: “If a statute needs repair, there’s a
constitutionally prescribed way to do it. It’s called legislation.”446

444. There is, of course, a huge difference between interpreting Section 2 to be a
no-fault statute with no efficiencies defense, and the enforcers bringing a case, and
requesting a remedy, that the enforcers do not believe is in the public interest. We
hope and expect enforcers would never bring any type of antitrust case or impose a
remedy in these cases they thought to be unwise, simply because defendant had
violated the law. This should apply a fortiori to no-fault cases. We hope and believe the
enforcers would believe that, even though anticompetitive conduct was not a
requirement of a violation, the remedy sought would benefit consumers and in other
respects be in the public interest.
445. A.M. ex rel. FM v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
dissenting).
446. Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1990 (2017) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). For an excellent analysis of these two Gorsuch references, see Robert
Connolly, Supreme Court Review Sought for Per Se Rule in Criminal Cases, CARTEL CAPERS
(Oct. 30, 2019), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/supreme-court-review-sought-for-perse-rule-in-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/TB48-9RMU].

